This morning’s New York Times has an “op ed classic” that dates from January 1990 but asks a question a lot of people are pondering in light of the Myanmar government’s (lack of) response to the recent cyclone disaster: “Are Invasions Sometimes OK?”
The columnist, Steve Sesser, who saw firsthand the people’s revolt of 1988, believed that at that time “the smallest gesture of U.S. military support — perhaps nothing more than a couple of battleships off the Burmese coast and a few warplanes over its skies — could have won the day for the Burmese people. Even today [1990], with the army deeply split, merely the threat of American intervention might alone be enough to bring down the dictatorship.”
In such circumstances, mightn’t U.S. military intervention be justified? If so, Sesser wrote, it raised a potential problem: “How could the principle of big-power intervention on behalf of human rights be established without a future American or Soviet government perverting it to prop up, as in the past, repressive dictatorships?”
Well, the Soviet government no longer exists. More to the point, in 2003, for better or worse, the United States established exactly the principle Sesser worried about: that of unilateral intervention, partially justified on the basis of human rights. So that metaphorical ship has pretty much sailed.
Why, then, isn’t a literal U.S. task force sailing toward Myanmar now?
For at least three reasons.
First, China and Russia both have opposed a proposal to have the United Nations insert massive humanitarian aid under cover of U.N. forces. It goes without saying that they would oppose a unilateral U.S. attempt — perhaps supported by a new “coalition of the willing” — to do the same thing. China is a particular problem since it shares a border with Myanmar and is the principal backer of the Myanmar military regime.
Second, a U.S. military intervention would have to be on a fairly massive scale. If the Myanmar regime were tempted to respond with force, which it almost certainly would, then enough assets would have to be in place either to deter such a response or to defend against it. And if the regime abruptly collapsed, the Pottery Barn principle would apply: having broken its government — however richly that government deserved it — the United States would suddenly own the problem of providing security and administrative order to a country the size of Texas and an impoverished population of 47.8 million.
Third, by the time such an intervention could be mounted, the humanitarian disaster it was intended to abate — a second round of massive deaths from starvation and disease — would already have occurred.
Taken together, these considerations mean that however much we might like to help a desperate people and, in the bargain, get rid of the creeps who govern Myanmar, the proposition is not realistic. And since the Myanmar regime has begun, however haltingly and corruptly, to allow the insertion of humanitarian aid, the best policy remains the one the Bush administration is pursuing: to coax along the regime as best we can and get the forces in place to assist as much as they will let us.
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I think the time factor is against us on this one.
Another day brings another update on the situation in Myanmar. According to today’s NYT, not only are there already a dozen US helicopters awaiting orders in Thailand, there is a three ship Amphibious Ready Group that will arrive offshore shortly with a re-enforced squadron aboard of another dozen +. Admiral Keating, PACOM himself, was on the C130 that landed in Burma today in order to make a specific offer to the government, outlining the help available from the United States.
Time is an issue, as is the case in any disaster relief mission, however we aren’t as far behind as one would think. Following the Christmas Tsunami of 2004 it was a week before the Lincoln Strike Group was off of Sumatra and beginning operations. It was nearly three weeks before the first UN assessment teams were flown ashore from the Lincoln. In the case of Burma, much of the aid is already waiting in Thailand for trans-shipment. The UN teams are already waiting to go, they just need permission, and the helicopters are on scene. With the go signal from the military government operations could begin nearly instantly.
The Department of the Navy’s new “Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower” lists humanitarian and relief operations as one of the six core elements of America’s naval strategy. It’s a mission that the Navy takes seriously and has worked to master over the last decade. ADM Keating’s personal trip to Myanmar demonstrates how serious the US government and military are about this disaster. The strengths of “sea-basing” allow for a relief effort with a small footprint ashore which is something that would be central to a successful operation in Myanmar.
The similarities with Operation Unified Assistance, following the Tsunami, are telling. The scope of the disaster appears to be similar to what was experience in Ache Province. The local government is suspicious of the American intentions. The destruction was focused on the littorals. The lack of, or damage to the local infrastructure limits access by truck or boat. Like Ache, the US military, and Navy in particular, can address all of these issues. Helicopters are central to relief efforts of this magnitude, with these challenges, and are one of today’s Navy’s strong points. Amphibious ships can move into shallow waters and provide close in support in the littorals. By taking advantage of sea-basing contact between the “dangerous” Americans and the “innocent” locals can be limited as US Forces man transportation and trans-shipment points and the local Forces take responsibility for distribution points.
The US Navy learned a great deal from the successes and failures experienced in Indonesia in 2005. The May 3 Cyclone offers an opportunity to put those lessons to good use. It is an opportunity to once again use hard assets to project soft power, and possibly have a significant political impact in the process.
Now the government in Myanmar simply must pull the trigger. The opportunity to initiate a “forced humanitarian intervention” still exists with the assets available, especially if the Chinese and Russians can be brought around in the United Nations. However, as the hours tick past, the fastest way to begin humanitarian operations is to assuage the fears of the Myanmar government by making clear to them the benefits of sea-basing and cooperation.
(For More on the 2004/2005 Operation Unified Assistance see “Waves of Hope: The U.S. Navy’s Response to the Tsunami in Northern Indonesia,” by Bruce Elleman, Newport Paper 28 from the US Naval War College Press.)
you break it, you buy it!
maybe it should be more like “you break it, I buy it”
I’m not sure if you’re for or against a US military intervention. There’s some good chat going on across the blogosphere on this, but where’s the action at?
Is it feasible or likely that anyone will try to put foreign troops on the ground in Burma?
Martin, In today’s NYT, Robert Kaplan argues that it’s feasible:
Whether it’s likely is another matter. I highly doubt it. This is one instance, though, where I’d like to be wrong.
I think this is do-able, both with and without permission. The biggest obstacle right now is access, and US Military helicopters that are either shore based in Thailand or sea based with the approaching ARG can solve that issue. The example set by the Tarawa Amphibious Ready Group in Bangladesh earlier this year is excellent.
The second question, force protection, is important but not an insurmountable obstacle. People forget that there were force protection issues during Operation Unified Assistance, with an active insurgency underway in Aceh Province. Besides, if the Burmese (are we supposed to call them Myanmarians?) tried to stop a forced intevention we would squash them like bugs (to borrow a phrase from ADM Fallon). Could they really stop us? Would they even try? I wonder.
Despite all this the liklihood of action is low, especially keeping in mind US experience in Somalia (which started as an armed humanitarian mission) and the lack of action in Darfur. If we (the international community) can’t figure out Darfur, Burma runs into the same issues. Jorge is right, the Pottery Barn rules applies, but if the UN authorizes the mission the UN is on the hook. I wonder how many troops from local southeast asian nations, under UN umbrella, it would really take to set things right in Burma?
(There is a problem with air-drops by Air Force aircraft. Water containers dropped from altitude tend to burst. Food without water accelerates dehydration and creates its own risk factors.)