Compromises only mask the underlying issue behind Iraq’s civil war
Reports from Iraq are showing that the war-torn country might finally be on the road to some mix of local and national reconciliation. The recent reduction in violence suggests this might be the case and Iraq’s bleeding may have been stopped.
Yet deals cut with our former Sunni-insurgent enemies to stop fighting us and become our allies against al-Qaida, along with the hope of compromise between the different factions in Iraq and the Iraqi government, may be taking our eyes off the fundamental issue that has yet to be resolved: Who will hold absolute power in Iraq, Shiites or Sunnis?
One observer in Iraq noted that the Shiites and Sunnis still have not recognized the need to share power and acknowledge that one group cannot dominate over the other. How this fundamental conflict is resolved, through compromise or civil war, is still anything but clear.
A long-standing conflict in America could not be resolved despite a series of compromises; it took the American Civil War to do that. In the 19th century, at least three major compromises sought to resolve the foremost issue of the day — slavery — and specifically what to do about it in the western territories. Many Americans thought that each compromise over slavery had allowed them to turn the corner and remove slavery as a hot-button political issue.
Congress in 1820 established a line along the southern edge of Missouri to mark where slavery could go in the newly acquired land from the Louisiana Purchase. When the aging Thomas Jefferson heard of the Missouri Compromise, he referred to it ominously as a “fire bell in the night.” He understood it would do nothing but delay the final reckoning of the issue of slavery. A compromise that placed a line on a map separating the slave-holding South from the free North would only inflame, not soothe, the raw passions and hatred building in America over slavery.
The same American political leaders who pulled together the first compromise came up with another 30 years later. The War with Mexicoled to newly acquired territories in which slavery was again a question. The Compromise of 1850 divided the new territory, making some of the area open to slavery and some of it closed. It did not resolve the fundamental issue of slavery itself.
Neither did a smart politician from Illinois named Stephen Douglas four years later, when he sought to organize the Nebraska and Kansas territories so that a transcontinental railroad could be built. The third compromise, the Kansas-Nebraska Act, essentially did away with the previous line that had kept the Kansas territory off limits to slavery. The territories of Kansas and Nebraska would be open to slavery if the white settlers in those areas wanted it. Douglas thought his compromise would soften the sectional rift between the North and South over slavery and that the economic development and westward expansion to California would ease tensions between both sides.
But it actually hardened both sides’ stances on slavery and inflamed tensions instead of easing them. Those for and against slavery fought a mini-civil war over whether slavery should exist in Kansas. For about two years, between 1856 and 1858, Kansas bled in a civil war that was a harbinger of what was soon to come: the American Civil War.
Today in west Baghdad, there is a district that brings to mind the Kansas conflict of the 1850s.
The Baghdad district of Sadiyah bleeds like Kansas did. Since it is a mixed area that holds both sects, Shia and Sunni fight over control of Sadiyah similar to the way Americans in the 1850s fought for control over Kansas.
Obviously there are huge differences in time and historical context between the two. But a troubling similarity is that in Bleeding Sadiyah — like Bleeding Kansas before it — the underlying cause that fuels this mini-civil war has yet to be resolved. In America in the 1850s, it was slavery; in Iraq today, it is who will hold ultimate political power, Shiites or Sunnis.
Despite the three compromises, only a horribly destructive civil war could settle the issues that separated North and South.
Iraq is likely to share a similar fate. Iraq is not yet out of its civil war, despite the reduced levels of violence of the past few months, because the underlying issue remains unresolved.
The final reckoning over who will hold absolute power between the Sunnis and Shiites may yet be determined through fighting.
A senior American military officer recently noted that “Sunnis need to realize they’ve lost and the [Shiites] need to realize they have won.”
Recent compromises and deals and lowered levels of violence in Iraq give the appearance that the Iraq civil war is over, with compromise and reconciliation to follow.
But history coaches us to be wary of such assessments when fundamental issues have yet to be resolved.
Reprinted from Army Times
19 Comments
only a horribly destructive civil war could settle the issues that separated North and South
This is not strictly true. It was a crushing victory for one side that settled the issue. An inconclusive war would not have done that, however destructive. (And I can imagine ways of triangulating the slavery issue eg have the federal government effectively buy out the slave owners, as in the British Empire.)
Applied to Iraq, this would seem to mean that things will settle down only when the minorities are crushed and compelled to accept their place in the New Order.
The Thunder Run has linked to this post in the – Web Reconnaissance for 02/29/2008 A short recon of what’s out there that might draw your attention, updated throughout the day…so check back often.
Parallels between post Civil War America and post-occupation Iraq aren’t particularly illuminating. There are many reasons for this. I want to mention just one: the nature of loyalties in each conflict.
In the US Civil War supporters of the losing side (as it happened it was the Confederacy) had nowhere to run to. They had to stay and take their medicine. As it turned out this medicine was not as bitter as feared. The final business of the Civil War was not completed until the 1960s and 1970s.
On the contrary, in the case of Iraq, the Sunni/Shiite conflict is just a local manifestation of a supranational sectarian conflict. Fully one half of the pre-”Shock and Awe” Sunni population are now displaced from their pre-2003 places of residence. A large number (perhaps 25% of the whole Sunni population) now live outside Iraq.
Nothing of the kind happened during or in the aftermath of the American Civil War.
This fact can mean several things. One is that when the US withdraws from Iraq there is still plenty of scope for the struggle to be continued, supported by Sunni groups with bases and political support beyond the borders of Iraq.
The task of the Federal troops garrisoning the South would have been much more difficult had there existed a large insurgency supported and funded by many people and interests living in (say) Mexico.
It is quite possible that the Iraq conflict will change quite radically in its nature once the US withdraw.
The analogies between the US Civil War and OIF are numerous. I have suggested to my classes that the insurgents are similar to the KKK. Katz’s point about an externally funded/supported insurgency can be found writ small in the decision of former Confederate soldiers to take up crime in the west. I would suggest that an externally-funded insurgency is nothing compared to an internally-supported one. The KKK was a powerful force in the South despite the presence of Union troops, in large measure because of the popular support they enjoyed from the remaining civilians. While the Union troops clearly did not wipe out the KKK, their presence did prevent a bloodbath. Despite the KKK’s continued existence in American society, their cause(s) has become so marginalized that they have no affect on the body politic any longer. As Katz points out, the practical (if not complete) end of the issues involved in the Civil War happened when people changed their minds in the 1960’s and ’70’s. Let’s hope the Iraqis prove a bit quicker on the uptake.
True, but what actual situation does this describe? The US is busy arming and funding the Sunni forces that in due course will be unleased upon the Baghdad, Shiite-dominated government. The above quote comes close to committing the fallacy of the excluded middle. For the Sunni insurgency have both. The Sunni insurgency, in temporary recess, awaits developments in Washington DC.
The timetable of that recess is set by two major factors.
1. The Sadrists have decided to sit out the remainder of the Bush regime, expecting a lower US profile under the new president whom they guess, probably correctly, will be a Democrat.
2. The Bush regime has demonstrated its willingness to aim and train parts of the Sunni insurgency. It would be foolish of the Sunni to upset this cosy arrangement by making premature use of this valuable sponsorship.
Only a small component of the Sunni Iraqi insurgency is analogous to the post-bellum KKK.
Neither the Reconstruction Era KKK nor their current Iraqi analogues represent a systemic threat to the new regimes they opposed. A vast majority of both the southern population and the Sunni population of Iraq want(ed) noting to do with either the KKK or AQ in Iraq.
Yet, most of the Sunni remain implacably opposed to the new Baghdad regime.
And the Shiite hardliners simply await an opportunity to finish uncompleted business of ethnic cleansing of Iraq. (Remember 25% of Sunni have already fled Iraq. This has occurred under the noses of the US occupation.)
The “Surge” is merely an interval that suits everybody’s tactical purpose:
Bush is buying counterfeit credibility for his egregious bungling of the entire Iraq folly.
The Sunni have profited from US sponsorship, temporary though it may be.
The Shiite hardliners believe they have all the time in the world. They believe they merely need to wait until US voters elect a new regime committed to withdrawal.
Katz, I would add one more dimension, which I previously mentioned on a comment addressing this subject at the SWJ blog. And that is the influence of Iran, particularly on the Shia dominated government of Iraq. This influence should not be underestimated. From my perspective, there is no rough analogy for this relationship in the experience of the American War Between the States. For this to be the case, the historical American experience would have to include a foreign military occupation from a world power, such as France or England, and a competing regional power, such as a Mexico on massive steroids. Even this analogy falls short, due to the cultural division experienced with the US occupation of Iraq, which stands in stark contrast to the historical and cultural relationship shared between Iran and Iraq.
I would go so far to say that this Civil War analogy to the Iraq War represents a forced historical perspective.
I agree Mark.
Another huge difference is the fact that Reconstruction was an attempt to reintegrate the Confederacy back into the social and political fabric of the US.
So far as the citizens of the ex-Confederacy were concerned, the US military presence represented a permanent state of affairs.
On the contrary, in Iraq, the US troop presence represents an attempt to make Iraq formally an independent nation. Moreover, most Iraqis know that the withdrawal clock is ticking.
There is little evidence that US preferences for Iraq will survive military withdrawal.
For example, even with more than 150,000 troops in the country, the US has not been able to convince the Maliki government to pass the Iraqi Oil Law. As oil represents the lion’s share of Iraq’s national wealth, its disposition will determine the shape of the coming Shiite Islamic State of Iraq.
I wonder if Bush thought back in March 2003 that his military adventure would result in the foundation of the second most powerful Islamist state in the world.
The overriding fact of the US military adventure in Iraq is that the US has not been able to impose its preferred Iraqi national leadership on the country. I’m racking my brains for an historical parallel for this failure. Perhaps the closest is the Petainist Vichy France.
I concede that the Bush regime was more committed than the Nazis in France to creating a genuine Iraqi sovereignty. Yet Bush’s attempt to stymie the popular elections that brought the current Shiite majority to power in the Iraqi parliament smacked of anti-democratic manipulation.
At least Germany enjoyed the clientage of Petain for some time, despite the fact that a large part of the population never recognised his legitimacy.
The US has achieved neither a national consensus in Iraq, nor a compliant puppet.
None of this has anything remotely to do with the post-bellum situation in the ex-Confederacy.
And if the US attempts to remove the Maliki government by force or by stealth, then the parallel with Petain will become more apt.
My point in this short oped was to use a historian’s sensibility of the past by drawing very loose analogies to spur readers to think about contemporary problems–in this case the Iraq Civil War–with some historical mindedness. It was not my intent to draw direct lines from the past to the present; as historians we all know the perils of trying to do that. If that is how such pieces are judged then one should never consider even writing one.
gian
I agree Gian.
The exercise is a fruitful one. And indeed you are correct to point out the difficulties inherent in establishing a settlement based on compromise.
My one comment on this issue is the following:
There is still much struggle to occur before one could be confident about either part of this assertion.
The Sunni still have resources to make civil government in much of Iraq impossible.
The Shiites know that they themselves are deeply divided, especially over the level of Islamism that will pertain and over the nature of the relationship with Iran.
Really, one of the current roles of the US troop presence is to maintain separation between Shia and Sunni military forces, and preventing them from taking to the field with medium to large sized battle formations. If the time comes when the US withdraws its ground force (and chooses not to intervene with its air forces), then we’ll see a true civil war, with an outcome and postwar situation possibly resembling certain elements of the historical case to which LTC Gentile draws parallels.
Katz, I’ll bet it never occurred to the architects of this war and occupation that they were setting up the first Arab Shia nation. Not only is there the eventual possibility for the establishment of a second Islamic Republic, there is a chance for this to coalesce with the primary example, into a form of Islamic Shia superstate.
In the current situation, the Shia appear divided. But I draw your attention to Iran’s relationship with the key Shia factions. Sadr resides in Iran, taking seminary lessons in Qom, in efforts at eventually becoming an Ayatollah along the lines of Khamanei. Yesterday Ahmadinejad was received in Baghdad by Maliki, Talibani and Hakim. Today he meets with Sistani at the holy cities. All the bases are covered.
At the outset of the Iraq War, the so-called neoconservatives were fond of saying “the road to Jerusalem runs through Baghdad.” I found that shocking, as it mirrored a saying popular with the Pasdaran and Basij during the Imposed War (1980-88).
Clearly you are quite impressed by the unity of Shiism in Iraq, Mark. I guess time will tell.
Meanwhile, arising from Gian’s article is this question:
Is it possible to argue that the Bush regime has attempted to find a compromise:
a. in good faith.
b. with the most important leaders of Iraq.
c. offering the optimum likelihood of as positive as possible outcome for all the important parties.
My suspicion is that the “Surge” is mostly a device to achieve something vaguely positive for Bush’s “legacy” and to offer the Republican Party some chance of political survival in the fast approaching 2008 political season.
In short, I suspect the good faith and sincerity of the Bush regime in relation to negotiations with Iraqi political actors.
Was lack of good faith a component of the various ante-bellum compromises mentioned by Gian?
“For example, even with more than 150,000 troops in the country, the US has not been able to convince the Maliki government to pass the Iraqi Oil Law. As oil represents the lion’s share of Iraq’s national wealth, its disposition will determine the shape of the coming Shiite Islamic State of Iraq.”
Such assured prognostications on such bad information. You seem to think that all one has to do is convince the Maliki government and there will be a new Iraqi Oil Law. You don’t seem to know much about the problem. You see, it is not the Maliki government that holding things up. It’s the Kurds. They want to continue controlling the contracts for the oil in their province and then send the Baghdad’s share to Baghdad. Baghdad wants to control the contracts and then send the Kurds and Sunnis their share of the revenues. Don’t you hate it when facts get in the way of a good argument.
Rich
Well Rich, to be precise, it’s not the Kurds that are holding up the Oil Law. it’s the Iraqi Parliament.
As backgrund information, you sould know that when the Iraqi Oil Law was proposed, the Sadrists were in the Maliki government.
But the effective majority enjoyed by he Maliki government in parliament collapsed after Nov 2006 under the strain of control of oil, and some other issues.
Maliki has proven himself to be incapable of holding his parliamentary majority together over the oil law.
The Iraqi form of government is a modified Westminster system. Under such a system the PM rules for only as long as he can command a majority. Sadr (or anyone else with a voice in the parliament) could easily move a motion of no-confidence in Maliki and have a very good chance of having Maliki removed. But why bother? The Maliki government is the closest practical approximation to having no government, which is fine in the view of rejectionist forces (Sunni, Sadrist, and occasionally Kurdish) while the US decides what it is going to do next in Iraq.
Here is the relevant section (44) of the Iraqi Constitution:
You don’t seem to understand the Westminster system very well.
Don’t you hate it when you discover that you don’t know as much as you think?
You use the word “Baghdad” in its political sense. What, precisely, do you think you mean when you do that?
If you mean the national government, I think I have demonstrated that as a political force in domestic politics it is virtually a nullity.
Can the word “Baghdad” have any other domestic political meaning?
In reality “Baghdad” is just a place-holder term for the entity that internationally represents Iraqi sovereignty, which is a fragile creation, yet still not entirely without vigour.
Katz, it isn’t Shia unity in Iraq I was necessarily referring to, but rather Iran’s central connection to the major players in the Shia dominated government of Iraq.
So here you have a competing sectarian political divide, inside a foreign military occupation, with a relatively strong regional power playing the sideline. I would argue that the “fundamental issues” in this case are multi-dimensional and inherently more complex than that offered by a Civil War analogy.
Katz thank you ever so much for that lecture on Westminster system.
We often speak of Washington wants this or Washington is doing that. We are simply saying the federal government wants something to be done. We say this even though there may be no unanimity within the federal government. In like manner we can say Baghdad or the interests of Baghdad even though there is no unanimity with the federal government in Baghdad. Thus the oil conflict is over the issue of control. Who will control all the oil. Baghdad is saying that it should be the federal government should control all the oil and the Kurds want to control their own oil.
Let me expand what you wrote, “Maliki has proven himself to be incapable of holding his parliamentary majority together over the oil law,” over the opposition by the Kurds. The weakness of a government is only shown when there is opposition.
Excellent though your lecture was it doesn’t change the dynamics of the issue. This is an issue between the federal government and the Kurdish province. The fact that the Iraqi Parliament cannot resolve the issue does not change the nature of the issue. In this respect, the example LTC Gian Gentile gave of pre-civil war American politics is apt. This is a state’s right issue.
Now I don’t know what the US can do with regards to this issue. Do you expect the US to pull a Charles I and dictate to everyone? This is an issue the Iraqis must solve.
Rich
I want to thank LTC Gian Gentile for a stimulating piece. It got me to review the Kansas/Missouri border wars, look a bit further into what is going on with the district of Sadiyah. I can certainly see al Sadr as Quantrill. And it got me to think a bit deeper about the war in Iraq.
However, I think the issue of slavery is a bit of a red herring. Slavery may have been the pretext for war but state’s rights was underlying issue. I see all the political maneuvers over slavery as an attempt to avoid tackling the primary issue: who would rule. In the end, the Civil War didn’t end black exploitation. That’s because it was never the real issue. In the end, state’s rights had been trimmed but shared rule was still the order of the day.
If I read your article correctly, ‘who will rule’ is the fundamental issue you see in Iraq. Until that issue is resolved the conflict in Iraq will continue. I don’t agree with your assessment that this is a Sunni/Shiite issue. That’s only part of the issue. Remember the Golden Rule: he who was has the gold rules. Left out of your assessment are the oil fields of the Kurds. The Kurds have a great deal of the gold. This is not simply a Sunni/Shiite issue. It is a Sunni/Shiite/Kurd issue. The recognition of the Kurds in this issue changes the dynamic of ‘who will rule’. This is not a zero/sum game. There will be no Appomattox in Iraq. The Shiites must come to terms with the Sunnis and the Kurds or all will lose including the Shiites.
Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani (the highest Shiite cleric in Iraq) has signaled he wants a peaceful resolution to rule in Iraq. Both Sunni and Shiite clerics have met together to encourage a peaceful resolution. Tribal sheiks of both Sunnis and Shiite tribes have met together to push for a peaceful resolution. The real problem for the government in Baghdad is reining in people like al Sadr and dismembering his Mahdist Army. Getting back to Kansas, the mistake the federal government made was sitting back and letting the two sides fight it out.
Rich
“The Shiites must come to terms with the Sunnis and the Kurds or all will lose including the Shiites.”—Rich
The Shia are not compelled to do anything. They’ve established themselves as the dominant player in Iraqi government, a government that is protected by means of US military occupation and US support for the Shia dominated Iraqi Army and police forces, and they have the leveraging force of Iran to blunt or counter US political dictates that do not suit their interest. The Shia strategy is to just sit tight, maximize their games, and position themselves for the time if and when the US occupation ends.
I am in full agreement with LTC Gentile, when he states: “The final reckoning over who will hold absolute power between the Sunnis and Shiites may yet be determined through fighting.”
Rich:
No. The Kurds are only one face of this problem. A united Shiite bloc in the present parliament would achieve passage of an oil law. But the Shiites are now quite disunited.
On the contrary, the US is desperately looking for the exit door in Iraq. The Door Bitch on that exit is wearing a big sign “Bush’s Legacy”. No one gets out of Iraq before January 2009 until they get past this Door Bitch. After January 2009, it’s a whole new ball game.
Mark:
I believe that you are over-estimating the internal cohesion of political Shiism in Iraq.
I too agree with LTC Gentile.
Mark Pyruz wrote:
“In the current situation, the Shia appear divided. But I draw your attention to Iran’s relationship with the key Shia factions. Sadr resides in Iran, taking seminary lessons in Qom, in efforts at eventually becoming an Ayatollah along the lines of Khamanei.”
Mark, last I heard (through casual reading), Sadr was notably anti-Iranian; the only significant Shiite leader who is. As you yoursefl pointed out (“Yesterday Ahmadinejad was received in Baghdad by Maliki, Talibani and Hakim. Today he meets with Sistani at the holy cities. All the bases are covered.”), the rest of the Shiite leadership gets along well with the leadership of Iran.
What information do you have that Sadr is in Iran?
Thanks,
Barry