The December 2007 issue of Armed Forces Journal contains two commentaries highly critical of FM 3-24 / MCWP 3-33.5, the official counterinsurgency field manual / warfighting publication adopted a year ago by the U.S. Army and Marine Corps. The first, by Ralph Peters, accuses it of being a “Dishonest Doctrine.” The second, by LTC Gian Gentile, “The Dogmas of War,” accuses it of being, well, dogmatic.
Dave Dilegge of the FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 hugging crowd at Small Wars Journal Blog offers an extended critique of the Peters commentary, with a critique of the Gentile piece promised shortly.
16 Comments
You’ve got to wonder if there is something personal between Peters and Petraeus – remember that stoush a few months ago over education in the officer corps? I used to like Peters’ stuff, but I rarely bother with him these days because he reverts so quickly to ad hominem attacks and grand over-statement to the point of outright mis-statement. Gentile also has some history with a couple of the authors of the manual (especially Dave Kilcullen, who was a student of mine a long time ago – interest declared up front there). But his piece is far more reasoned and reasonable, and I look forward to the critique of it when it appears. And Mau Mau was far more complex than Peters lets on here (although I do wonder a little about the sudden return to prominence of Galula, whose stuff never registered, at least on my radar screen, in the past. French COIN was Trinquier, first and last.).
It seems to me that LTC Gentile’s critique moves in two distinct directions. First, he claims that the new 3-24 is overly dogmatic, and that commanders in Iraq are following it without question. Second, the claim that our emphasis on counterinsurgency is causing our “high intensity conflict” skills to atrophy. I agree completely with the latter assertion, but am not so sure about the former.
As I get to observe Baghdad from a front-row seat, it appears to me that emphasis on the 3-24 doctrine, applied by a more appropriate number of troops, is working at the tactical level. I don’t personally see how pursuing a different operational or tactical approach would be appropriate right now in Baghdad. If insurgent forces surface in greater numbers elsewhere in the country, as they indeed might, we will need to shift back to “kinetic” operations, as we did in Baqubah over the summer.
Dear Professor Grey:
Interesting whay you say about Galula never registering on your “radar screen” because he never registered on mine. I think the writers of FM 3-24 in their quest to break the American Army out of what they saw as its “conventional mindset” and fetish with Clausewitz saw in Galula something new and “fresh.” Almost like what American airmen saw in Douhet in the 1930s.
gian
For those of you who, like me, are relatively clueless about Galula, he was a French colonel who served in the Algerian War and wrote extensively on COIN. The best known of his books seems to be Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, (1964). It is the first book listed on LTC John Nagl’s Amazon.com list of recommended works on COIN. Nagl was one of the authors of FM 3-24.
I first encountered Peters’ writing shortly after the bombing of that mosque which kicked off the big anti-Sunni ethnic cleansing campaign in Baghdad. He claimed that he had ridden around with an American unit all morning, had seen nothing happening, and that therefore there was nothing happening. I need not say what this meant about him.
Nothing that I’ve encountered of his afterwards has changed that initial perception.
I suspect that the reason that Galula is the point of reference for French COIN these days is that he avoids the taint of torture and association with the OAS (military-based conspiracy that tried to assassinate de Gaulle after he decided to cut Algeria loose) while Trinquier is tarred with both. Oddly enough Galula’s longer book (recently released by RAND) apparently discusses what might be called “enhanced interrogation” techniques quite matter of factly and at some length.
I really think that Galula is the point of reference for US COIN, not French COIN. I have read quite a lot in the literature in French, primary and secondary, on the Algerian War, and cannot remember having run across a solitary mention of Galula or his books. I only became aware of his works about 18 months ago.
Roger Trinquier’s Modern Warfare, on the other hand, is cited by all sorts of authors and French officers writing about the war. Trinquier was highly respected in the French military establishment, while I would be surprised if anyone really even knew who Galula was. Galula is coming off of a larger endeavor in the French Army after Indochina to make sense of what they called “la guerre revolutionnaire.” Galula’s work fits well into this, but most often is taken totally out of its proper context, which is probably due to the dearth of English language materials on the Algerian War. I find it irritating to read COIN analyses that use Galula as a starting point, since most have no idea about the real events of the Indochinese and Algerian Wars, or the French military mindset and doctrine development at the time.
Christopher:
You are spot-on that Galula is the US reference for Coin; in fact if you read FM 3-24 the US Coin doctrine is Galula. In my AFJ piece I had a paragraph that the editor removed for space issues that highlighted the relatively small contribution of Galula and the fact that American Coin doctrine was fundamentally premised on the experience of one French infantry company commander–a company commander!–in the French Algerian War. What was most bothersome to me was that the authors of the Coin manual could place so much emphasis on Galula yet leave Clausewitz off of the classic reading list at the end of the manual. How did that happen?
gian
Gian,
I appreciate your comment. I think if people really wanted to understand COIN in the Algerian War, they would read Maurice Challe’s “Notre Revolte,” Raoul Salan’s “Memoires: Fin d’un Empire,” Jacques Massu’s “La Vraie Bataille d’Alger,” etc. All of them put their COIN ideas into the context of the actual events and their experiences in the war. Unfortunately, none have been translated. Salan and Challe also participated in the coup attempt against de Gaulle. I’m working in the archives on Algeria at the Service Historique de l’Armee de Terre in Paris at the moment, and there is tons of great information available that goes far beyond Galula’s work.
Peter Paret’s book is cited in the manual, I believe, but it is very dated.
I didn’t see Jomini or Sun Tzu on the classic reading list either. Jomini isn’t particularly noted for talking about this, but there is a section on popular war in “The Art of War.”
Christopher:
Thanks to you too. I wish i could read those books you mention on the Algerian War but i fear they are in French and my French is a bit rusty. But your citing them furthers the idea that there is much more to the Algerian War than David Galula.
Of course one has to make choices when it comes to such things as reading lists. But when I asked one of the senior writers of FM 3-24 last year why Clausewitz was left off he tacitly acknowledged that it was to try to break the American army out of its “conventional mindset,” which i guess meant that we should blame Clausewitz.
Roger Spiller, who is the visiting professor at the History Department at West Point this year, pointed out to me a passage from Clausewitz from Book III where he talks about the critical importance of military virtue in wars of the people. So if Clausewitz is thinking about problems with irregular warfare at the classical highpoint of regular warfare isnt that an indicator that one of the most important American doctrinal manuals in the last 30 years should have had him in there? I would have easily traded Galula for Clausewitz, or if not that then certainly the Marine Corps Small Wars Manual which is about worthless in practical terms for soldiers preparing for Coin in Iraq.
gian
Christopher,
Apparently I phrased my comment in a misleading fashion. Calling Galula “the point of reference for French COIN these days” was meant to note that in the current American discussion of COIN, Galula is the preferred reference to the extensive literature produced by the French. It was not to say that he is a central figure for the French themselves. In terms of the development of guerre revolutionnaire, you’re quite right that Trinquier is a major author and Galula is not. At the risk of appearing cynical, Galula is a safe work to cite to show you know something about the French experience (no bad associations), Trinquier isn’t (torture, the “generals’ mutiny”, etc.).
I’d be very interested in learning about your research, by the way. I’ve been doing some digging into the influence of guerre revolutionnaire on the development of the Brazilian national security doctrine in the 1960s, when the US is usually blamed for being a bad influence on Latin America. If you’re interested in an exchange off this blog, you can contact me at redrob64 at juno dot com.
Galula was unknown in French Military until recently. I recommand reading “Bataillon RAS” from Jean Pouget. In this short semi-fictionnal novel, then-commandant Pouget, the Author of “Camp n°1″ on the subject of French POW in Vietminh’s hand, told about its experience as a batallion commanding officer in Southern Algeria. This unit almost comprised enlisted soldiers that were restive to their duty against rebels. In less than a month, Pouget claimed his autority and used COIN procedures that belong part to the coercion’s realm and part to the “velvet gloves”‘ one.
Seen from France, FM 3-24 has a dual sense: it is seen as “reinventing the wheel” and it is seen as a true learning curve. What is more important to french officers and doctrinal thinkers (as general Vincent Desportes) is the very sense of this learning. What make sense is the link between COIN doctrine, whether it is a political artifact or an effective doctrine to COIN ops, and other concepts in American Doctrine. For example, EBO appears to be a pace in the good direction, because of its potential to orient the lines of operations not as sequential tasks but as effect-based tasks.
Last word: sorry for my flawed english
I guess accessibility of a source counts for something, as in the case of Galula. The language issue is a big one too, as well as the context that RedRob mentions of torture and coup attempts. I don’t think those aspects should stop us from learning from those authors, however, it just needs to be taken into account when evaluating the source, like all sources. Challe (in archive sources) actually called for an end to the “exactions” in 1959, basically saying they were counterproductive. Massu and Salan are unapologetic about the torture, but still have some very useful ideas otherwise.
There are two good edited books by Martin Alexander in English on the Algerian War, which both use archive sources, but unfortunately both are very short, and only scratch the surface.
I’ll send you an e-mail soon, RedRob, I’ve heard about the Latin American connection before a bit.
Stephane, I’ve heard of the Pouget book (in fact, I saw it displayed in one of the bookshops along the Seine this afternoon in Paris). I’m not in the French military (or in any military), but my reading of available French documents and such today seems to agree with what you say about French doctrine. I did pick up a copy of General Marcel Bigeard’s “Pour une parcelle de gloire” today. Bigeard fought in WWII, Indochina, Algeria, and was a military advisor for the Central African Republic and Madagascar after decolonization. He is often considered the model of the French paratrooper in the wars of decolonization, and I’m hoping his memoirs include some worthwhile discussion of COIN strategy and tactics.
Also, Gian and Stephane, if you wanted to e-mail me about anything regarding this discussion, I’m a PhD student in international relations, and can be contacted at cwgriffi at usc dot edu.
Christopher/Stephane/et.al:
I read last night a really superb article by Colin Gray in “Strategic Studies Quarterly” on Irregular War titled: “Irregular Warfare: One Nature, Many Characters.” You may have already seen it but if not, and i highly recommend it, here is the link to it.
I liked it a lot because Gray places irregular war and COIN within the overall context of war and does not try to characterize it as something that it is not, like “armed politics” or “armed social science” or such other nonsensical labels for counterinsurgency.
Hey Stephane; no need to apologize for your rough english because if i were trying to write something intelligent in French it would have stopped after 5 words.
no worries
gian
Many thanks Gian (for English and al.)
What a pity you can’t read french!!
(I’m joking). You would have appreciated French doctrine on Stabilisation. I will try to send you a summary of FT01 “gagner la bataille, conduire à la paix” in English (or maybe you should read english-US Version of this article).
I recommend especially “Adaptation of Army Doctrine to Adaptation”.
A bientôt
Sincerely