In a letter to service and civilian personnel of Multi-National Force-Iraq, GEN David Petraeus offers a heads up concerning the report that he and Ambassador Ryan Crocker will shortly be making to Congress:
Up front, my sense is that we have achieved tactical momentum and wrested the initiative from our enemies in a number of areas of Iraq. The result has been progress in the security arena, although it has, as you know, been uneven. Additionally, as you all appreciate very well, innumerable tasks remain and much hard work lies ahead. We are, in short, a long way from the goal line, but we do have the ball and we are driving down the field.
Petraeus goes on to sketch the good, the bad, and the ugly of the current situation. The part most interesting to me is his disappointment in the degree of “tangible political progress” on the part of the Iraqi government, but as with the letter as a whole, this section has a very measured, “on the one hand, on the other hand” quality.
Here, in PDF format, is the full text of the letter.
(Hat tip to Chris Ives)
17 Comments
What could be worse? A military plan with an outcome dependent on foreign political cooperation- in, of all places, the Middle East! Surely, I can’t be the only one that sees the futility of this approach. I like the football analogy. Trouble is, the game is rigged. Those Shia politicians are intent on go-slow. They don’t want to see a political breakthrough. Such a breakthrough would reduce their domination in government, and produce a lasting US influence in the country. To the Shia, lack of political progress (as the US puts it) is a form of succeeding resistance to the US occupation. The fact that the US plan hinges on this just strikes me as calculated political subterfuge provided for its own domestic political consumption. And who is stuck in the middle? The men and women of the United States Armed Forces.
Don’t overplay the Shi’a domination. They are the minority in this region–and their only “ally” is a Persian pariah. When push comes to shove, they would rather have US protection in the region than have to be put in the same boat with Iran.
I agree with you, Colonel Ridde, it’s a complicated situation. The Shia definitely see their US benefactors as an advantage, and are quick to show their insecurity when Patraeus pays tributes to Sunni forces, where it’s currently being done in Anbar province.
Still, it must be conceded that the reconciliation window being sold to the public in this military plan is unrealistic. And the local mentalities at work in this quarter of the Middle East are quite easily read. Remember, these locals call this conflict The 2nd American War. They blame the US for everything. Sure, some of them will smile to your face, but the whole time they have resistance on their minds.
As for the Iranian card, you’re right, it has its limitations. But it also carries its own potentialities. There will be no direct confrontation between Iranian forces and US forces. There will, however, be continued Iranian support for the Shia, which includes money, weapons, sanctuary, religious influence, capital goods and services. Don’t forget, all of this adds up to a form of Shia leverage within the internal politics of Iraq and the overall Iraqi relationship to the US.
The US escalation of the war in Iraq is now costing upwards of 12 billion dollars a month. Not surprising, it has produced some tactical gains. And, to be sure, General Petraeus is a capable commander. But the war is far from complete. This is year five. The historical comparison that keeps coming to mind is the Israeli experience of the 1st Lebanon War.
Mark,
My sense is that US public opinion won’t support this thing for more than 2-3 years (on the outside), regardless of results on the ground.
Related commentary to the Iraq War.
Today there was an Associated Press newswire concerning Iraq’s deficient logistical support for its present day armed forces. This is nothing new. During the opening phase of the Iran-Iraq War in 1980, it was logistical shortcomings that continuously undermined Iraq’s initial advance into Iranian territory. During the invasion, Iraqi logistics suffered devastating blows from Iranian F4 Phantom and F5 Freedom fighters, flying dedicated interdiction missions. For the rest of that war and the 1st Gulf War, the only Iraqi units anywhere near adequately supplied were RG (Republican Guard).
Concerning Iraqi battlefield weapon, vehicle and equipment maintenance, unless it was performed by Soviet or French services during the Iran-Iraq War, it has always been marginal to nonexistent. Instead of maintenance, Sadaam’s Army was always provided replacements during the Iran-Iraq War, paid for by Saudi, Kuwaiti (and US) sources, and continuously outfitted with arms and munitions from the USSR.
It must be admitted that despite intensive US efforts and massive investment, the Iraqi Army remains a battlefield liability in the war. Worse, it is thoroughly infiltrated by every corner of the Iraqi resistance.
Tonight I had the good fortune of catching an interview of Lt. Col. Nagl on CSPAN2. He is an impressive and well spoken military thinker. He was interviewed by Sean Taylor, Army Times Senior Writer.
Colonel Nagl brought up several points which I’d like to question. For instance, he champions the historical British effort at pacifying Malaya. I’d like to point out that for this one perceived success, there are numerous French, British, Israeli and US failures at COIN. Substantive factors in each conflict vary, and merely pointing out that a specific conflict can be successful does not demonstrate that such is the case using perceived lessons gained from such a specific example.
Colonel Nagl offered his opinion that Americans will support a long (and expensive) war. I don’t know how he supports this contention. Americans grew weary of the conflicts in Korea and VietNam. In fact, at the end of WWII, US leaders such as George C. Marshall expressed concern that public support for the Pacific War would falter with a war extending into 1946.
The Colonel also expressed his perception that the US turned away from COIN after the experience of VietNam, emphasizing instead conventional warfare. I’ll offer my opinion here: in many cases, COIN is simply a fancy technical phrase to describe a failed war of occupation, often resulting in an incomplete military conquest and an ultimate withdrawal.
Lastly, Colonel Nagl brought up the US victory over the USSR in the Cold War. However, he completely neglected the failed Soviet war of occupation in Afghanistan, which did much to bring about the sudden demise of the USSR.
I’ve noticed there are more than a few US Army Officers that contribute postings and commentary to this excellent blog site. I’d like to offer a humble suggestion to military thinkers engaged in the process of winning the war in Iraq.
I’ve noticed a perceptual tendency to subjectively degrade enemy efforts on the battlefield in Iraq. There seems to be an attitude that just because the enemy uses tactics that offer a form of war unsuitable to many of the weapons systems and tactics of the US military, that such methods of war are somehow below acceptable standards of warfare. For example, the use of unconventional tactics of war by the enemy- unconventional because the US Army hadn’t foreseen the use of such- is actually looked down upon. This subjective outlook narrows the perception of military thinking, resulting in diminished capability in the planning and execution of a war.
I’ll provide a recent example. Over a year ago, every military analyst and journalist I encountered blindly accepted the fact that Israel would militarily crush the Hezbollah defense in southern Lebanon. It was a preconceived conclusion held by all- except me. That summer, I wrote a number of analysts and journalists in Israel and the US, successfully predicting the actual course and outcome of the 2nd Lebanon War. (You can imagine the very negative attention I received at the time.) How dare I think of such a thing? How indeed. I did it by analyzing the opposing forces in real military terms, rather than accepting the hyperbolic labeling made popular by domestic politics. And the historical analogy I was fond of using at the time was the Battle of Normandy before Caen, between the British/Canadian armies and the 12th SS Hitler Jugend Division, itself a paramilitary formation.
Military thinking requires a coldly objective approach. And the basic lessons of war should never be obscured by popular political and social perceptions of a given time and space.
Mark,
Regarding the second Lebanon war I have seen it written that Israel did so badly against Hizballah in a conventional war precisely because the IDF had been focused for so long on COIN in the Palestinian arena.
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Jaron:
Good point.
This is off topic to this post but I’ll mention it anyway for comment. There’s a current controversy regarding a recent violation of Syrian and Turkish airspace by the Israeli Air Force (IDF/AF). The fact that the Israeli jets apparently jettisoned external payloads suggests they were successfully engaged by Syrian air defenses. There is widespread speculation over the nature of the Israeli air mission, suggesting testing of Syria’s air defense and/or testing of an air corridor for a potential air strike on Iran. Since the conclusion of the 2nd Lebanon War, where the IDF/AF enjoyed total air supremacy, Iran has offered friendly MidEast nations enhanced air defense systems. It’s possible that such is now the case with Syria.
Also, today there was an article in Asia Times Online by Sami Moubayed that claimed the Syrian Air Force successfully shot down an IDF/AF combat plane during the 1956 War. This is not listed on the ACIG Middle East database for Syrian Air-to-Air Victories since 1948 (http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_272.shtml). Anyone out there ever heard of this claim?
For those interested in the military history of aerial warfare, I recommend viewing of the ACIG web site. It contains a detailed database of aerial victories for all the world’s air forces.
I don’t know enough about the Syrian thing to comment. Regarding Turkey, I was under the impression that in recent years at least Israel had an agreement with Turkey that allowed use of Turkish airspace (obviously in a coordinated manner) for training. Airspace in Israel is a bit limited.
Yes Jaron. The agreement provides airspace for specified training exercises agreed upon in advance. The current intrusion seems to be a violation of Turkish airspace. Few details are available on the incident. It would be interesting to know the type of aircraft used, such as the new long range F-16L recently delivered to the IDF/AF. Also, it’s possible the F-16L external fuel tank is model-specific, providing evidence to support certain suggested mission objectives.
I have read reports that the recent Lebanon events were a wake up call for the IDF to spend more time on conventional warfighting and less on COIN.
Mark,
OK, I read a bit more about this on some news sites.
Mark,
First assumptions:
1. An overflight over Turkey is risky
2. An air attack on a specific Syrian target would have to had some US clearance
3. It is a big risk, so what it was either a target that had to be hit (nuclear or CBR maybe?) or alternately it was a “feeler” to see what reaction would occur.
4. I have read that Syria has remained mute on what was actually struck.
My impression is that doing this is risky enough that it had to have been a very high value target or it wouldn’t have justified the dangers.
Interesting article by Gareth Porter in today’s Asia Times:
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/II14Ak02.html
The article contends that Centcom Commander Admiral William Fallon considers General Petraues “an ass-kissing little chickenshit”.
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle_east/article2512380.ece
It appears that Israel did this because of nuclear material in Syria.