Yesterday’s New York Times Magazine has a meditation by political scientist Michael Ignatieff about how a smart guy like himself managed to be so misguided in his support for the March 2003 invasion of Iraq. Entitled “Getting Iraq Wrong,” long stretches of it deal less with Iraq per se than with the various ways by which intelligent people can still make bad policy choices.
A lot of professors, pundits and policy makers were ensnared by the intellectual traps he describes, many of them having to do with ideology and emotionalism. Others who opposed the war fell into similar traps, just in a different part of the political spectrum.
The people who truly showed good judgment on Iraq predicted the consequences that actually ensued but also rightly evaluated the motives that led to the action. They did not necessarily possess more knowledge than the rest of us. They labored, as everyone did, with the same faulty intelligence and lack of knowledge of Iraq’s fissured sectarian history. What they didn’t do was take wishes for reality. They didn’t suppose, as President Bush did, that because they believed in the integrity of their own motives everyone else in the region would believe in it, too. They didn’t suppose that a free state could arise on the foundations of 35 years of police terror. They didn’t suppose that America had the power to shape political outcomes in a faraway country of which most Americans knew little. They didn’t believe that because America defended human rights and freedom in Bosnia and Kosovo it had to be doing so in Iraq. They avoided all these mistakes.
In many respects, I’d include myself among those whom Ignatieff identifies as having displayed “good judgment.” But there’s an important difference. A lot of the people who showed good judgment actually spoke out, demonstrated, emailed their elected officials and wrote letters to the editor. Aside from grousing to a few colleagues and close friends, I didn’t do a damn thing. I just let it happen.
It’s not that I think my efforts would have made any difference. But not even to have tried — that’s some kind of sin.
UPDATE, August 9, 7:18 a.m.: Ralph Luker at Cliopatria has a posted a “roundup” of blogs that address the Ignatieff column.
31 Comments
The sin of omission, in a way. I understand, I was the same at the time: despondant, “knowing better,” and just staying the heck out of the politics. And we are all sinners for it; but I also think that we represent the malaise of the era, in so many ways. I can name the events that cast me down and what a sad list it is, and in the end perhaps we should aspire to stand above the status quo and charge on ahead with our convictions. But we did not, and the greater question is “why not?” I hope that future leaders will look back at our inaction and see it as a mirror the age. Perhaps, one hopes, a mirror holding images we can all learn from.
:::KBS
“the unfolding catastrophe”.
Funny how one fixed idea, one assumption, can poison all that follows.
When the “catastrophe” unfolds into something positive and workable, what price your bogus breast-beating? Your remorse over not having been cynical enough?
You and Ignatieff need to spend way more time thinking about goals and commitment to reaching them and way less about looking good for other academics and similar ego-obsessives.
It was not precise to say “unfolding catastrophe.”
We attained full-stop debacle when the Samarrah mosque was fire-bombed. NOAA would put that as a Category 5 Catastrophe.
Poor Phase IV planning was a Category 2 Catastrophe. The leadership of GEN Casey, et al, before and during and after Abu Ghraib could be considered a Category 4 Catastrophe.
The 3,000 dead, 22,000 wounded — give or take — have each been a signpost bent and tortured by the ill winds of SecDef Rumsfeld, in the end perhaps more devastating than Katrina, if not as visible to the 24-hour cable news channels.
If the so-called “Surge” of fewer troops in Iraq than we had in the 2005 elections is successful, perhaps we can downgrade Iraq to a Category 2 Catastrophe, and clean up as best we might with our Hollow Force II tour.
I spoke out, saying that while I was all for getting rid of Saddam, I did want a good reason to trigger the removal and never got one. For that, I was called a communist, a traitor, a queer and a coward. I am a coward, but I don’t really fit those other categories. It did no good, except to make me feel better now.
All of the breast-beating for want of a perfect transformation of Iraq into America junior is childish. Have these people taken into account the costs of not removing Saddam, the costs of post-Saddam Iraq, the costs of Syria and Iran meddling.
When should a debased people be allowed to grow–on someone elses watch? Would another generation or two of slaves be anymore able to self govern? Saddam invaded Kuwait and lost. International law was on our side and international law is just scratchy toilet paper if it is not enforced.
I notice that this supposed guide to clear thinking, with its strong emphasis on the primacy of facts over theory, consists largely of unsupported assertions.
In particular, the statement: “Theory gets in the way.”
If I release a pencil in midair, I expect it to fall to the floor, based on my experience with falling pencils in the past. I predict a kiwi fruit would do the same, based on my experience with objects in the past. My predictions about the future must be based on theories developed in the past, because certainly I have no facts about the future.
We should question our theories, and the facts we think we have, but I do not think Ignatieff said that.
Returning to Iraq, pre-war Ignatieff presumably believed:
a) The US can successfully conquer Iraq.
b) It can administer Iraq afterwards.
c) It can bring together an Iraqi government with a reasonable degree of democratic legitimacy, also capable of governing Iraq.
Obviously the US succeeded with a), but failed with b) and c).
“Good Judgement” would seem to require anticipating this.
Experience in Bosnia* would seem to suggest that b) and c) would be possible, but not easily and quickly.
Good judgement would seem to require that you can explain why intervention in Bosnia stopped a civil war, and intervention in Iraq started one.
*I also think that interesting comparisons might be made with the Russians in Afghanistan, the Indians in East Pakistan etc.
Professor Grimsley, I realized from the onset that Sadaam didn’t possess WMD’s. I followed the Iran-Iraq War closely, and I actually believed Sadaam’s statements regarding the issue. The thing about Sadaam was that he was so darn predictable. Even the invasion of Kuwait was predictable, as a backlash against Kuwait’s insistence of repayment of war lans made during the long, ruinous war with Iran.
I believe it worth studying the difference between declared US war aims, and undeclared but practical war aims that have now become obvious. All wars are driven to some degree by economic motives and the war in Iraq is no exception, rather it is a prime example of a war directed by specific economic interests. This must be realized in any serious, objective analysis.
ad: I wouldn’t claim that the US succeeded with a). If anything, the “mission accomplished” was a statement referring to the logistics of deploying an army into Baghdad, and not much more. At the time, I couldn’t believe the videos of young Iraqi men of fighting age, lining the highway to Baghdad, as US armor entered the city. What I couldn’t believe was that these men were not being rounded up and interned. What a huge mistake! Obviously, Franks and his staff had no idea as to effect an outright conquest on a country the size and scope of Iraq, the execution of which was outrageous in its own amateurishness.
Mark, on reflection I should have written “a) The US can successfully invade Iraq and overthrow the existing regime.”
It has done that, in the sense that Iraq is not currently run by the Ba’ath Party.
I admit that the full implications of the word conquest would require success in b)
To be fair to Franks, there was a planning staff beneath him, and the Pentagon above. I assume he made the same assumption as the above: that b) and c) will follow if you destroy the existing regime.
I suppose every army dreams of winning the Six Days War, but none of them wants to think about governing the West Bank.
Mark P.: It’s hard to get at people’s actual motives. Indeed, I think we often fail to fully grasp our own motives. This is true even for policy decisions where there’s a substantial evidence trail. But on balance, I tend to think that the Bush administration acted on a sincere neo-conservative vision that it was possible to export democracy to Iraq, and that the removal of Saddam Hussein to permit this was preferable to a continued program of sanctions, no-fly zones, etc. Personally I think this was naïve. Neo-cons are really just liberals with a different agenda. That is, they are overly optimistic about their ability to engineer a society to their liking. I myself am more of a traditional conservative, in that I am skeptical about our ability to engineer society, particularly those with other cultures. I firmly believe in the law of unintended consequences. But it doesn’t change my sense that the rationale underpinning the invasion was ideological and not economic in any straightforward sense.
ad: I like the comment about the Six Day War and the West Bank.
Brian H and Tim H: Phrases like “bogus breast-beating” and “childish,” and accusations that Ignatieff’s opinion and my own are expressed merely to “look good for other academics and similar ego-obsessives” are uncalled for and will not be tolerated. You’re welcome to express your opinions. But don’t you dare denigrate those of others. I’ve got a delete key and I don’t mind using it.
I spoke out, I wrote my senators, I even went to a few war protests even though I didn’t necessarily agree with all of the folks around me. When expressing my apprehension with respect to democracy flourishing in the middle east I was called a racist. When I objected to the war on what I thought were reasonable grounds, I was accused of supporting Saddam. I even had my patriotism called into question because I “supported terrorists”. In other words, I didn’t think it was a good idea to invade, therefore I must support Saddam and since he supported terrorists, I was also supporting terrorists indirectly. There was a lot going on to suppress dissent, and I wouldn’t be shocked to find out that many folks who objected didn’t speak out.
I wrote my Congresscreature — ostensibly a liberal Dem — and, for lack of any more effective tactic, went to an anti-war rally or two. And of course I told people that nothing but disaster would result. None of it did any good.
Note that the war began at a time when it was never easier to get minority or dissenting opinions, courtesy of this very medium. A free and informed citizenry, acting through its representatives, did precisely zip.
The lesson I draw from that, and continuing sell-outs and roll-overs from the “opposition” party, is that we now live in a well-armed banana republic. We go through the ritualistic motions of “democracy”, but it’s a dead letter.
I guess that, in hindsight, it shouldn’t be a surprise: My favorite example is our studied refusal to confront our petroleum habits — a neurotic deferral that’s been going on for pretty much my entire adult life. In that time, the few political candidates who tried to raise the issue in an honest manner have always been savaged.
Sorry for the rash phrase from my earlier post. Let’s change “childish” into “asking for all things to be easily accomplished”. If you believe in international law, or the UN or of any of the treaties and agreements that attempt make the world safer and more propserous, than you must believe in enforcing these laws, resolutions and treaties. Even when it may be difficult.
If you agree that removing Saddam was moral (i.e. not a pacifist) and legal than the aftermath will have to be faced. The UN, whose resolution for Iraq to face “serious consequences”, has been criminal in it’s conduct with respect to de-Saddamized Iraq. UN member states who refused to assist in the removal of Saddam or the restoration of order in Iraq have failed the international order and the Iraqi people. The US politicians who voted to authorize the removal of Saddam, but who now want to leave without explaining that Iraq is stable and a better place have no moral standing.
Apology accepted.
The enforcement of UN resolutions was a minor element at best in the Bush administration’s rationale for invading Iraq. The principal reasons stated at the time were a) the presence of WMDs, b) a purported linkage to Al-Qaeda, and c) the danger that Iraq would supply WMDs to Al-Qaeda. It insisted that invading Iraq was vital to the larger Global War on Terror.
Evidence for a linkage to Al-Qaeda was thin to the vanishing point, and Iraq had agreed to re-admit UN weapons inspectors prior to the invasion. Hans Blix, the head of the inspection team, reported that the Iraqis were still being somewhat intransigent but that progress was being made. In short, prior to March 2003 the Bush administration deserved credit for forcing the Ba’athist regime back into compliance with the most important UN resolution in question.
The United States’ ultimatum to Iraq — that Saddam Hussein and his sons leave the country or else — was plainly designed to trigger a war, and under international law, Operation Iraqi Freedom was an unprovoked attack upon a sovereign nation. It’s an interesting point as to whether a rogue regime (which Iraq surely was) may forfeit some of the rights of sovereignty, but most scholars of international law consider the US action unjustifiable.
My personal belief at the time was that Saddam Hussein did have WMDs but was unlikely to use them unless the survival of his regime was at stake. So I figured our invasion guaranteed he would use them. I also thought an invasion of Iraq would be a massive diversion from the business of defeating Al-Qaeda, and I felt reasonably sure that we would have real problems trying to hold Iraq together in the aftermath.
On balance, then, an invasion of Iraq struck me as indefensible under international law and a distraction from the business of finding and killing Osama Bin Laden. I favored continued sanctions — the “smart sanctions” suggested by Colin Powell — coupled with aggressive UN inspections backed by an ultimate use of military force if the Ba’athist regime continued to defy us. (As I recall, France and Germany made such a proposal but the U.S. rejected it out of hand. I’d like to check on that, though.)
I certainly did not get everything right. I anticipated a bloody battle for Baghdad — true for them, not for us. I did not foresee an insurgency, certainly not on the scale that emerged, nor did I foresee an outright civil war.
Had I been a member of Congress in 2002, I hope I should have had the guts to vote against authorizing the war. I think many of those who voted in favor of it did so not because they embraced its wisdom but because they feared the political consequences. Others, I think, voted for it because they believed the Bush administration had a stronger case for the presence of WMDs, etc., than turned out to be the case.
Given that we found no WMDs and actually created a strong Al Qaeda presence in Iraq, the sole remaining rationale for the U.S. presence in Iraq is to stabilize a society that we ourselves have destabilized on a massive scale. (I’m not sure anyone still believes in the possibility of creating a democracy in Iraq, which a year ago was a still a commonly entertained idea.) The question is whether we have a reasonable possibility of success in doing so. I don’t think we do.
I felt sorry for the Iraqi people under the tyranny of Saddam Hussein — but not sorry enough to have American soldiers fight and die to end that tyranny. In that sense, I am and always have been a traditional conservative. I feel sorry for the Iraqi people now — but not sorry enough to have American soldiers fight and die in a vain bid to fix a country that is beyond fixing.
There are far more important and relevant reasons for staying in Iraq than issues of ‘mere’ humanitarianism. The Sunni Arab sword that shielded Jordan, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia from the Islamic Republic of Iran is gone. In its place is a Shia dominated Iraq, on its way to itself becoming an Islamic Republic, were it not for US interference and a US military force on the ground. Under no circumstances can Israel and the US permit an Islamic superstate to become dominant in what is arguably the West’s most important geostrategic region in the world. Such a Islamic Shia superstate would effectively subvert the US economic war aim that has driven this war from the onset, and deliver to the Iranians a total victory, and a formidable position with which to effect its own policies upon the region.
If you wish to realize the true motives for any war, you must seek out the underlying forces of economics, otherwise you’re largely subscribing to mere propaganda put forth in the name of political science.
My opinion is that most people weigh the rational for going to war based on hindsight–it was WMD after we found no WMD, or it was nation building when nation building wasn’t working, or it was the evilness of Saddam when the mass graves were uncovered. Even I admit to favoring “Upholding International law” as the main reason. Iraq forfeited it’s sovereignty when it lost the first gulf war. However, the combination of those things made the invasion of Iraq acceptable to me based on the fact that smart sanctions and aggresive UN inspections means the removal of Saddam (the smartest of all sanctions) and war (aggressive inspections).
As far as what I believe are the true motives for the invasion of Iraq–The instability of the Middle East resulted in 3000 Americans Killed at work, a trillion doller hole in a New York city, and a people and government traumatized by an act of war. The target (Iraq) and timing were dictated by present circumstances.
First of all, I don’t know what warrant you have for believing how most people weigh the rationale for the war based on hindsight. It seems to me that they weigh it based on the Bush administrations stated rationale: WMDs (we found none); link with Al Qaeda (wasn’t there, although thanks to us there is one now); upholding international law (most observers outside the U.S., and many informed observers within it, do not accept that the invasion was justified because it was not a last resort); building democracy in Iraq (hasn’t happened: there’s some of the form but little of the substance); and has made the U.S. safer (doubtful). As for Saddam Hussein being such a bad guy: he was a bad guy all along, but in the 1980s he was our bad guy and we backed him during the Iran-Iraq War.
I am unaware of how a nation loses sovereignty simply by dint of losing a war (except in cases when that nation is simply absorbed by another; e.g., western Poland by the Germans in WWII), and I do not think that claim was made in the agreements that ended the war. Certain conditions were placed on Iraq — that is common enough after most wars — but loss of sovereignty was not among them.
With regards to the Iraq-Al Qaeda connection may I recommend, among others, the Wall Street Journal , the New York Sun and two pieces in the Weekly Standard, here and here.
You understanding concerning the UN inspectors is a bit faulty. This second set were sent in with a different agenda than the first ones. They were not to try to ferret out WMDs, as the first ones were, but to confirm that all had been destroyed. Blix not withstanding, there was little evidence that Hussein was seriously cooperating with them. And why should he. We now know he had the assurances of France, Germany and Russia that there was little to fear from the UN.
Prior to the US ultimatum, Bush had repeatedly said no invasion would be forthcoming if Hussein would fully cooperate with the UN mandate. It took us a year to build the resources to invade. Had Hussein cooperated within that time, the invasion would not have happened. Unfortunately for Hussein, France Germany and Russia kept assuring him the US, England and otheres would not dare to invade. It seems to me it was Hussein’s intransigence which led to the invasion.
Was the attack a violation of international law? Article 51 states: “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.” It has been argued that an implied threat, not just bombs, would be an acceptable provocation for attack. This is what the Japanese argued for it’s attack on Pearl Harbor. And, it has been argued that this was retained in Article 51. Therefore, the unwillingness on the part of Hussein to settle the question of WMDs was an implied threat and a legal justification for a preemptive attack. One may not like it but it does seem to cover the legal bases. Thus Hussein’s intransigence was the provocation for war.
Finally WMDs. The UN had told Hussein the he must destroy all his WMDs. He refused to comply. While he had no WMDs active at the time, he had not destroyed his research facilities with regards to nuclear weapons as he had been instructed to do. He had mothballed these facilities and not destroyed them. With these facilities still available, once the pressure was off, Hussein would have been able to quickly ramp up his efforts to obtain nuclear weapons. Without the invasion we could now be looking at both Iraq and Iran as nuclear powers.
With our not very informed prognostications concerning the failure of the Iraqis to establish a stable government, here are some things to think about. 47 countries’ have reestablished their embassies in Iraq? The Iraqi government currently employs 1.2 million Iraqi people? 3100 schools have been renovated, 364 schools are under rehabilitation, 263 new schools are now under construction and 38 new schools have been completed in Iraq. Iraq’s higher educational structure consists of 20 Universities, 46 Institutes or colleges and 4 research centers, all currently operating?
The Iraqi Navy is operational with 5-100-foot patrol craft, 34 smaller vessels and a naval infantry regiment. The Iraq’s Air Force consists of three operational squadrons, which includes 9 reconnaissance and 3 US C-130 transport aircraft (under Iraqi operational control) which operate day and night, and will soon add 16 UH-1 helicopters and 4 Bell Jet Rangers? Iraq has a counter-terrorist unit and a Commando Battalion. The Iraqi Police Service has over 55,000 fully trained and equipped police officers. There are 5 Police Academies in Iraq that produce over 3500 new officers each 8 weeks.
There are more than 1100 building projects going on in Iraq. They include 364 schools, 67 public clinics, 15 hospitals, 83 railroad stations, 22 oil facilities, 93 water facilities and 69 electrical facilities. 96% of Iraqi children under the age of 5 have received the first 2 series of polio vaccinations. 4.3 million Iraqi children were enrolled in primary school by mid October of last year.
There are 1,192,000 cell phone subscribers in Iraq and phone use has gone up 158%. Iraq has an independent media that consists of 75 radio stations, 180 newspapers and 10 television stations. The Baghdad Stock Exchange opened in June of 2004. And, candidates in the Iraqi presidential election held a televised debate.
With regards to Al Queda, many of the Sunni paramilitary organizations, which had been working with Al Queda, have turned against them and are working with us to destroy Al Queda. 80% of the sectarian strife occurs within a 20 mile radius of Baghdad. With the disruption of the Muslim cleric al-Sadar’s militia there has been a precipitous decline in sectarian violence. Both Shiite and Sunni clerics are working together to eliminate this violence.
As far as a stable secular government succeeding in Iraq, if the US doesn’t pull the rug out from under them, I think the Iraqis will pull it off. I think this because the Iraqis know it is in their best interest. It may not quite be in the form it is now but hell it took us 7 years to get it right. Look at the latest flair up in the Iraqis government. The Sunni members of the government resigned in protest. This is a political tactic to resolve a political issue. Such protest moves are a staple of European politics. No guns, no riots, no putsch.
But why should we care? Because it is in our vital national interest to have a stable pro-western government overseeing the oil resources of this region of the middle east. Our men and women in Iraq are fighting and dying to protect the interests of the United States not the interests of Iraqis.
Rich
>>Our men and women in Iraq are fighting and dying to protect the interests of the United States not the interests of Iraqis.
Rich:
That statement is only partially correct. The economic aim of this war isn’t necessarily anchored to a cause of nationalism, it is probably more apt to refer to this cause as supranational private interests utilizing the public resources of the United States. Also, one must consider the fact that public funding of over $400 billion dollars US have been expended on this effort, with a relatively small amount generated in private profit. Total profits of main US businesses in Iraq are, to my knowledge, only in the high $100’s of millions US. Also, regional stability has suffered as a result of the US invasion, and not been strengthened as you suggest.
The statistics you provide are all fine and well, and the press articles from the mainstream media seem reassuring, but when you consider the strength of al-Qaida in Iraq today and compare it to its strength prior to the US invasion, the results are disappointing. So too are the statistics regarding the millions of Iraqi refugees that have flooded into Syria and Jordan, to escape the civil war that engulfs their country. So, too, are the relatively high US military and civilian contractor casualty numbers. So, too, is the empowerment of Iran in the region.
I disagree with you, Rich. The overall US position in the region was actually stronger before the invasion, than it is now. So, too, the condition of US conventional military forces, as a whole. This operation, so far, may be characterized as a blunder. But all is not lost, steps are in place to stabilize the operation, and expect the US to be involved in this effort on a time scale comparable to Israel’s 1st Lebanon War.
I was amused by your reference to the Iraqi Air Force. This is a diversion of mine, I concede, but I’d like to bring to light some historical notes concerning the Iraqi Air Force (IrAF). The Iran-Iraq War, 1980-1988, saw spectacular actions involving aerial combat. The first line fighters of the IrAF were the MiG-23 and MiG-21. The first line fighter of the Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force (IRIAF) was the F-14A Tomcat and the first line fighter-bomber the F-4D Phantom. Many months before Israel launched its strike against the Iraqi nuclear reactor site at Osirak, Iranian F-4D’s successfully hit that site with airstrikes, causing massive damage to the structure. The war also saw an IRIAF F-14A successfully shoot down four IrAF MiG-23’s, flying in a formation, using a single AIM-54 Phoenix missile. There were also numerous engagements between IrAF MiG-25 Foxbats (and MiG-25RB’s) and IRIAF F-14A Tomcats. Some of the Foxbats were actually flown by Russians and East Germans. All in all, the Soviet equipped IrAF performed poorly and the IRIAF was able to achieve a total Tomcat kill score of over 150 Iraqi combat planes. In 2005, the IRIAF performed a flyby using three Tomcats at the Tehran Military Day. Congress has of late made repeated efforts at prohibiting spare Tomcat part sales to Iran, with limited success.
References for above notes:
Iranian F-14 Tomcat Units in Combat by Tom Cooper, Osprey Publishing Limited, 2004.
Iranian F-4 Phantom II Units in Combat by Tom Cooper, Osprey Publishing Limited, 2004.
Mark , it doesn’t take a member of Mensa to realize the nature of the threat that would exist should Iran and a radical government in Iraq control the oil production of those two states. Without firing a shot, they could destroy the economies of Western Europe and the US. This would happen even if we don’t draw a drop of oil from this region. Al Qaeda has already made two strikes at the heart of our economic structure (attacks at two different times on the world trade center). Control of the Iraqis oil fields will give them a much more powerful tool with which to strike at us again. So forget your private interests. A third attack on our economic infrastructure, coming in the form of control of the middle east oil, will be felt by you and me.
Since this is a military history site let’s discuss the buildup of Al Qaeda in terms of goals and tactics. I believe their main goal is, in an alliance with Iran, middle eastern hegemony. Their best chance of doing that is to neutralize the US. Their best chance to do that is to cripple the US (and the west) economically. They can’t cripple us militarily. It was not by chance that twice they struck at the financial heart of the US (New York).
The toppling of the Hussein regime gave them an opening to gain control of the Iraqis oil fields through violent takeover. Al Qaeda took the very risky tactic of massing their forces in Iraq. Now Al Qaeda must win or die in Iraq. To reach their goal they must gain the support of a major disaffected portion of Iraqis. The Sunnis were a natural ally. Their major successes were in Sunni areas where they could blend in with the population. From there they could make strikes at the Iraqis infrastructure and the Coalition forces and wear the west down. This is guerilla warfare.
From the very beginning Al Qaeda made a tactical error. Instead of working within the Sunni communities, they attempted to hold and control those communities. It side-tracked their major mission of attacks on infrastructure and Coalition forces. This is what missive from ben Laden and the leadership in Afganistan/Pakistan had been stressing to Al Quaeda in Iraq. It was ignored.
Mistake #2. Al Qaeda troops in Iraq turned on the very people they needed for support. Because of the vicious and wanton attacks on the Sunnis, in an attempt to dominate them, they turned their natural allies into enemies. Sunni militia forces which had worked with Al Qaeda have flipped sides and are working with us to destroy, the now hated, Al Queda.
These errors have now exposed Al Queda to the major weakness contained in the initial decision to mass forces in Iraq. By massing troops in a single country they have exposed themselves to destruction by conventional forces. They have no where to turn in Iraq. Through their vicious methods of terrorizing local populations they have no natural allies. Their only safe positions are those they make locally through terror. These locals, at the first chance, will tip-off Coalition forces which will overwhelm the Al Qaeda forces. Within the last few months, Al Qaeda has lost a tremendous number of experienced troops. Al Qaeda cannot sustain these magnitude of loss. While it doesn’t cost much to strap on a bomb to some idiot and have them blow themselves up, well-trained and well-lead forces takes money and training which takes time.
As a side note, Iran has not placed all its eggs in the Al Qaeda basket. They have tried to initiate sectarian wars in Iraq. It is not a coincidence that 80% of the sectarian violence has occurred within a 20 mile radius of Baghdad. Nor is it a coincidence that as the militia forces of the cleric al-Sadar, which are based in Baghdad, have been disrupted, sectarian violence has greatly decreased recently.
With regards to Al Qaeda, time is on the Iraqis side. As Al Qaeda forces are being hunted down and destroyed, the political, economic, military and social structure of Iraq strengthens. What Al Qaeda needs now is for Coalition forces to pullout and let the political divisions in Iraq degenerate into violent divisions. Then they can do what they should have done in the first place: Ally themselves with a disaffected portion of Iraq and divide and conquer.
Time is on the Iraqis side in another respect. It has become clear that Iran is a major supporter and backer of Al Qaeda in Iraq. This is a threat to Arab powers such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia. They have a fear of Iranian hegemony. As such, it will also be in their interest to support a stable government in Iraq as a wall against future expansion of Iranian power. There are old divisions working here. Iran is Persian not Arab (Arab blood is royal. Persian blood is not). It is Shia not Sunni. Finally, it is a religious dominated government while Egypt and Saudi Arabia are secular.
Thus as long as US troops are in Iraq the better the chances there are of a stable government developing. Pull them out and political divisions will degenerate into violent divisions which Al Qaeda will exploit.
Rich
Thanks for the response, Rich. You know, I personally identify with Professor Grimsley’s stated purpose for this blog: “Toward a broader vision of military history”.
Your latest commentary suffers from a distortion of Middle Eastern socio-politics. Al-Qaida’s philosophy of sunni fundamentalism is in violent conflict with the Shia, whose power source is Iran. This conflict is locally framed as Salfi (or Wahhabism) versus the Safavid. (An excellent source of information regarding this struggle is The Shia Revival by Professor Vali Nasr , Professor in the Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School.) It must be understood, Rich, that these two forces are in active combat in Iraq.
I don’t believe the top priority of Al-Qaida to be the Iraqi oil fields. They are not materialists. Their priority is the prevention of a Shia state being built in Iraq, and the engagement of US military forces in the region.
In regards to its declared war against the United States, I believe it relevant to identify successes of al-Qaida war aims in Iraq: a) financial stress on the US government to the amount of $400 billion dollars US, for cost of the war so far (most if not all on borrowed money from far eastern lending sources), and b )the relatively high casualty rate among US military personnel and private contractors. Honestly, Rich, al-Qaida in Iraq strikes me as a bare bones fighting force, numbering probably no more than 1500 foreign fighters at any one time. If this is indeed true, it has pulled off one of the most stunning performances in military history. Of course, how much of the effort of the insurgency is attributable to them is hard to define, and the propaganda waged between the war’s protagonists makes it difficult to verify such grandiose claims.
You must admit, Rich, that the US operation in Iraq has not gone according to plan. The US did not envision any active resistance on the part of the Iraqis or foreign fighters. It diid not envision the empowerment it would provide Iran. It did not envision the need of borrowing over $400 billion dollars to finance this effort, it did not envision the need to put US troops through tours of duty, some now reaching the fifth time, it did not envision the needs and cost of maintaining military equipment in the field of battle for over fours years now. I could go on, but you probably see my point.
One of Professor Grimsley’s main points for this particular blog post was identifying that the Iraq War was a mistake for the US. I find it very hard to defend this war, militarily or politically. And I believe that, initially, the US war aim was driven by an economic aim that has yet to be in any way fully realized. That said, however, it appears that, given US Congressional approval, this regional instability may yet pay off handsomely for US arms merchants and manufacturers, for weaponry provided or sold to nations such as Israel, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.
Re the idea of Iran, Iraq, or any other country being able to destroy our economies through an oil embargo of the United States or Europe, would that not more likely entail the destruction of its own economy? Sitting on a lot of oil is of little use if you don’t sell it.
You know, Professor Grimsley, speaking of economic issues, the Iranians recently shifted their policy of foreign payments for oil purchases, from US dollars to Euros. It caused outcry in a number of editorials, especially in Israel, and was certainly seen as an attempt to undermine US centered economic interests. From the Iranian perspective, the move was retaliatory.
It should be realized that prior to the US invasion of Iraq, both Iran and Iraq’s oil production lay outside the direct controlling interests of the world oil industry. Now, even though Iraq has been occupied, its oil production has remained disappointing, in the face of repeated attacks by insurgents. Iran, on the other hand, remains outside the order. Also, the oil agreement that Iraqi legislators continue to stall on final approval is seen by many as a means of binding Iraqi oil production to the direct influences of the world oil industry. Two leading Iraqi oil trade unionists recently visited our region, pleading their case against the proposed agreement.
But, to be sure, Professor Grimsley, this is not exactly military history.
Mark,
I’ll kick this dead horse one more time. You re-stated 5 reasons that were given by the Bush administration for going to war. The importance given for each you do not say (you got one wrong, however; Bush did not specify links to Al Queda–he specified links to terrorists). Critics, I believe, choose to increase the import of whichever reason is the most discredited (but only after so). Hence, my hindsight argument.
As far as upholding international law, I find it curious that informed observers in and out of the United States would define “last resort” as Saddam would have defined it rather than as the freely elected leaders of several prosperous and populous democracies defined it.
And, finally, Iraq lost it’s sovereignty after Gulf war I because, at the least, it lost significant access to an entire province, lost it’s ability to produce and sell its oil (a significant amount of its GDP) as it wishes, and was unable to legally upgrade its own defense.
No, Tim, the Bush administration did specify an Iraq-Al-Qaeda link, and quite extensively. Here’s the relevant portion of Colin Powell’s statement to the UN on February 5, 2003:
It goes on like that for several more paragraphs.
Re the international law aspect of the Iraq, see this article by Prof. Mary Ellen O’Connell, an expert on the subject, explaining why the U.S. case did not pass muster. She stopped well short of calling it a war crime, which was the conclusion of forty-three Australian legal experts. Even neoconservative Richard Perle stated the US invasion was indefensible under international law, but in his view, so much the worse for international law:
You missed the point about the oil fields Mark. The oil fields are only a means to end. That end is the economic destruction of the west, especially us. There is a good chance that if extremists gain control of Iraq, Saudi Arabia will fall next.
I have to smile when academics begin talking about what they believe to be the incompatibilities of Sunni fundamentalists and Shias. They need to come out of clouds and see what is going on. The Shia state of Iran is funneling millions of dollars worth of weapons and money to the Sunni organization Al Qaeda. After all, I believe it’s an Arab saying: “The enemy of my enemy is my friend.” We are the enemy of both.
Come on Mark, Shia Iran is not poring money and weapons to Al Qaeda so a Shias state won’t be built in Iraq. This is just common sense.
As for things not going to plan, hwo many battles in the American revolution did we lose before we began to win? How many generals did Lincoln go through before he found Grant? As for blunders, how about WWII and the massing of our ships in Pearle Harbor. How about losing the Philippines. Have you heard of Kasserine Pass? And then there is that strategic gem: invading Germany through the soft underbelly of Itally. We never did break the Gothic line. How many unnecessary lives did that cost. Talking about unnecessary lives, how about Eisenhower’s tactic of putting pressure on the Germans everywhere to see where the Germans would break rather than choosing where to strike and then envelopment. How many GIs died needlessly? Oh, let’s not forget, in Korea, that brilliant stroke of McArthur’s to pierce the 48th parallel. The there is the siege of Khe Sanh. The North Vietnamese suckered Westmorland into pulling troops from the coast to rush support for Khe Sanh. Their real goal was the coastal cities which were left almost undefended. So you’re finding blunders in Iraq? What a surprise.
The biggest blunder has nothing to do with Iraq. The biggest blunders is tying down hundreds of thousands of troop in obsolete bases. We have a hundred thousand troops in Europe. Forty thousand are in Korea. Why? Leave some in some of the eastern European countries as a quick reaction force (the eastern European countries would love the money that brings), and bring the rest home.
You mention the the “relatively high” casualty rates. Relative to what? Looking at military deaths, in Vietnam in 1968 we sustained a 25% casualty rate among combat soldiers. If you look at the casualties for the total war in Iraq, we have sustained 5% casualty rate. (We have 160,000 soldiers in Iraq however I counted of those 160,000 only 80,000 were combat troops.)
With regards to the $400 billion the vast majority of that money was spent in reconstruction. This had nothing to do with fighting Al Qaeda.
Finally I understand that Dr. Grimsley feels the Iraqis war is a mistake. I disagree with him. We could not go on not knowing the status of WMDs in Iraq. The UN was far too corrupt to deal with the issue. Had Hussein been more forthcoming there would have been no war. With the fall of Hussein it was imperative that a pro-western government be created to protect the oil supplies from getting into the Al Qaeda terrorists. Getting the answer to WMDs and insuring the safety of the part of the world’s supply of oil are in our national interest. And national interest is the only reason for going to war.
Concerning Dr Grimsley’s skepticism about using oil as a weapon, this is a natural western liberal (little L) materialistic view. However, as you Mark pointed out these are not materialists. As far as they are concerned they are doing God’s will and if this causes hardships it’s irrelevant. Besides, embargo is not necessarily the way to go. They simply raise the price to where our economies can no longer sustain these prices.
Here is a thought. President Bush can use the same interpretation of Article 51 to make a surgical strike on the nuclear facilities in Iran. I’m sure the US have copies of the Russian plans which were used to build these facilities and probably have worked out ways to break through and destroy these facilites. As with Iraq, the UN is on record condemning Iran for their nuclear development.
Rich
Hi Rich:
I’ve seen the same communiques regarding reported linkage between Iran, the Sunni insurgency, al-Qaida and the Taliban. Right now, it seems that the US is blaming Iran for everything that is going wrong in Iraq and Afghanistan. But in real military terms, Rich, it just doesn’t match the reality on the ground. The vast majority of combat taking place between US forces and Iraqi insurgents is being executed by Sunni elements with the financial and weaponry support of Saudi Arabia. And, the vast majority of Al-Qaida’s foreign fighters are coming from Saudi Arabia. The Taliban? The Taliban draw their supplies directly from their safe haven in Pakistan.
Iran’s intentions in Iraq are obvious. Had there been no successful Iraqi insurgency, it is a sure thing that Iran would be the next target for a US invasion. A Shia dominated democracy in Iraq is definitely beneficial to the interests of Iran. So when Sunni and al-Qaida elements undermine the Shia democracy, it runs counter-productive to the intterests of Iran. Many analysts and pundits make the mistake in believing that the government of Iran will purposely carry out policies detrimental to the state. This is unrealistic.
Your analogies to past battles fought by the United States is noteworthy. However, the reality of the US military effort in Iraq vastly differs from the legends that have been built around the battles you mention.
The relatively high casualty rate refers to the figure of 50,000 plus killed, wounded and evacuated, out of a total peak of 160,000, which has been continuously rotated.
I’ve some additional military statistics to offer. Regarding US cost of the War in Iraq:
Predicted cost of a “surge” of 21,500 US troops into Iraq, according to White House calculations in January: $5.6 billion, a figure offered the month Bush’s surge strategy was announced.
Predicted cost of a one-year “surge” of 30,000-40,000 troops, according to Robert Sunshine, assistant director for budget analysis of the non-partisan Congressional Budget Office (CBO): $22 billion (two years for a cut-rate $40 billion). These figures were offered in testimony to Congress five months after Bush’s “surge” was officially launched.
Percentage of dollars annually appropriated by the US government and spent on Iraq-related activities: More than 10%, or one dollar out of every 10, according to the CBO’s Sunshine.
Estimated monthly cost of the Iraq (and Afghan) wars: $12 billion – $10 billion for Iraq – a third higher than in 2006, according to the non-partisan Congressional Research Service.
Estimated total cost of the Iraq war, if Robert Sunshine’s “optimistic scenario” – 30,000 US troops left in Iraq by 2010 – plays out: More than $1 trillion. (If his less optimistic scenario proves accurate – 75,000 troops in 2010 – closer to $1.5 trillion.)
Estimated cost of deploying an American soldier to Iraq for one year: $390,000, according to the Congressional Research Service.
Here are some military statistics to offer:
Number of attacks from June 2006 through May 2007 on US supply convoys guarded by private security contractors: 869, a near tripling from the previous 12 months.
Estimated number of bullets fired by US troops for every insurgent killed in Iraq (or Afghanistan): 250,000, according to John Pike, director of the Washington military-research group GlobalSecurity.org. This comes out to 1.8 billion rounds of small-arms ammunition yearly. With US munitions factories unable to meet the demand, 313 million rounds of such munitions were purchased from Israel last year for $10 million more than if produced domestically.
Percentage of amputations performed on US war-wounded in Iraq: An estimated 6%. The average in earlier US conflicts, where the equivalents of IEDs (improvised explosive devices) and car bombings did not play such a role, was 3%.
Total number of attacks against US and coalition forces, Iraq security forces, Iraqi civilians, and infrastructure targets in June: 5,335. This works out to a daily average of 177.8, an all-time high since May 2003, according to the Pentagon, and 46% more than in June 2006; more than 68% of these attacks – 3,671 to be exact – were launched against US troops, up 7% from May 2007.
Number of attacks in July using the most powerful type of roadside bomb: 99, an all-time high, according to Lieutenant-General Ray Odierno, US second-in-command in Iraq, accounting for one-third of US casualties last month.
Number of US military deaths in the “surge” months, February-July: 572, according to the Iraq Coalition Casualties website. This represents 189 more American deaths than in the same set of months in 2004, 215 more than in 2005, 237 more than in 2006.
Increase in bombs dropped in Iraq in the first six months of 2007 compared with the first six months of 2006: Fivefold.
Number of times the airport base outside Basra, which houses a well-barricaded regional US Embassy office and the last 5,500 of the 40,000 troops the UK dispatched to Iraq, has been attacked by mortars or rockets over the past four months: 600.
Estimated tonnage of US equipment that might be driven out of Iraq and shipped home from Kuwait in case of a decision to withdraw: One million tons.
Rich I took these statistics from Tom Engelhardt’s article in Asia Times. This is just a fraction of statistics available at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/IH15Ak03.html.
As for your contention that it may be a good idea to bomb Iran, it is a known fact that Iran already possesses at least 12 Kh-56 Soviet era cruise missiles, and I suspect they are nuclear armed. Let me know if you’re interested in my analysis of the Iranian military and I’ll provide it to you.
Mark, you’re a bit behind the times. One of the suppliers for weapons to the Sunni insurgents is the US. It seems that a number of these insurgent armies are now fighting with the US to drive Al Qaeda, a Sunni organization, out of Iraq. Seven of the major insurgent movements have formed a political organization in part to work with the US as the US withdraws from Iraq, at least in Sunni Iraq. Among the organizations is the 1920 Revolution Brigades, Ansar al-Sunna and Iraqi Hamas. According to a spokesman from the 1920 Revolution Brigades, Iran had offered to provide them with weapons and other support which these organizations rejected. The importance of this is that Iran is quite willing to provide military support to these Sunni insurgents.
I think you’re understanding of “Iran’s interests” is a bit naïve. A free democratic Shia government is not in the interest of Ahmadiabooboo and the mullahs who run Iran. In fact, it would be a threat to their position in Iran. As I said before, Iran is trying to supply weapons to Shia insurgents such as the Mahdi Army under mullah al-Sadr, and Sunni organizations such as Al Queda and the 1920 Revolution Brigades. Iran wants total chaos in Iraq so we will pull out and so no democracy can be established there. I’m sorry if this doesn’t fit with your views of Iran but it is what is going on on the ground.
I find it puzzling that you would try to minimize what can be learned from past military conflicts. Also, your “relatively high” casualties are meaningless unless you place them in relation to some other casualty rates. Otherwise your term is meaningless. If we compare the casualty rates with that other great insurgent war, Vietnam, your “relatively high” casualty rates become “relatively low” casualty rates. So unless your use of the term “relatively high” is simply a rhetorical devise there needs to be something that they are compared to.
Finally, I never indicated whether I agree or disagree with any proposed strike by the US on Iran’s nuclear facilities. I was simply pointing out that the rationale used by the US for invading Iraq can also be used for a strike on Iran. Also, I see no reason to believe that the cruise missiles are armed with nuclear warheads. Information of that magnitude would have leaked out.
Thank you for your gracious offer with regards to information on the Iranian army. However, I would not want you to go to that effort for information for which I have only tangential interest. Now if you had information on the Persian army of the 16th century, that is information I could use.
)
Rich
Connection between Iraq and Al Qaeda.
I apologize for the length of this post. In a secret memorandum, obtained by the Weekly Standard, dated October 27, 2003, Undersecretary for Policy, Douglas J Feith, wrote to Senators Pat Roberts and Jay Rockefeller, the chairman and vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee. Feith laid out 50 points which supported claims by the administration of contacts between Iraq and Al Qaeda. The information was obtained by the FBI, DIA, CIA and NSA. Much of the material was collected while President Clinton was in office. The article from which I lifted these points included many but not all 50 points. I further selected out some that needed additional information for clarity. I have already presented the location of the article itself in a previous posting on this website. If there are any questions about this material please refer to the original article.
* 4. According to a May 2003 debriefing of a senior Iraqi intelligence officer, Iraqi intelligence established a highly secretive relationship with Egyptian Islamic Jihad, and later with al Qaeda. The first meeting in 1992 between the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) and al Qaeda was brokered by al-Turabi. Former IIS deputy director Faruq Hijazi and senior al Qaeda leader [Ayman al] Zawahiri were at the meeting–the first of several between 1992 and 1995 in Sudan. Additional meetings between Iraqi intelligence and al Qaeda were held in Pakistan. Members of al Qaeda would sometimes visit Baghdad where they would meet the Iraqi intelligence chief in a safe house. The report claimed that Saddam insisted the relationship with al Qaeda be kept secret. After 9-11, the source said Saddam made a personnel change in the IIS for fear the relationship would come under scrutiny from foreign probes.
* 5. A CIA report from a contact with good access, some of whose reporting has been corroborated, said that certain elements in the “Islamic Army” of bin Laden were against the secular regime of Saddam. Overriding the internal factional strife that was developing, bin Laden came to an “understanding” with Saddam that the Islamic Army would no longer support anti-Saddam activities. According to sensitive reporting released in U.S. court documents during the African Embassy trial, in 1993 bin Laden reached an “understanding” with Saddam under which he (bin Laden) forbade al Qaeda operations to be mounted against the Iraqi leader.
* 8. Reporting from a well placed source disclosed that bin Laden was receiving training on bomb making from the IIS’s [Iraqi Intelligence Service] principal technical expert on making sophisticated explosives, Brigadier Salim al-Ahmed. Brigadier Salim was observed at bin Laden’s farm in Khartoum in Sept.-Oct. 1995 and again in July 1996, in the company of the Director of Iraqi Intelligence, Mani abd-al-Rashid al-Tikriti.
* 11. According to sensitive reporting, Saddam personally sent Faruq Hijazi, IIS deputy director and later Iraqi ambassador to Turkey, to meet with bin Laden at least twice, first in Sudan and later in Afghanistan in 1999. . . .
* 14. According to a sensitive reporting [from] a “regular and reliable source,” [Ayman al] Zawahiri, a senior al Qaeda operative, visited Baghdad and met with the Iraqi Vice President on 3 February 1998. The goal of the visit was to arrange for coordination between Iraq and bin Laden and establish camps in an-Nasiriyah and Iraqi Kurdistan under the leadership of Abdul Aziz.
* 15. A foreign government service reported that an Iraqi delegation, including at least two Iraqi intelligence officers formerly assigned to the Iraqi Embassy in Pakistan, met in late 1998 with bin Laden in Afghanistan.
* 16. According to CIA reporting, bin Laden and Zawahiri met with two Iraqi intelligence officers in Afghanistan in Dec. 1998.
* 17. Iraq sent an intelligence officer to Afghanistan to seek closer ties to bin Laden and the Taliban in late 1998. The source reported that the Iraqi regime was trying to broaden its cooperation with al Qaeda. Iraq was looking to recruit Muslim “elements” to sabotage U.S. and U.K. interests. After a senior Iraqi intelligence officer met with Taliban leader [Mullah] Omar, arrangements were made for a series of meetings between the Iraqi intelligence officer and bin Laden in Pakistan. The source noted Faruq Hijazi was in Afghanistan in late 1998.
* 18. Faruq Hijazi went to Afghanistan in 1999 along with several other Iraqi officials to meet with bin Laden. The source claimed that Hijazi would have met bin Laden only at Saddam’s explicit direction.
* 23. Iraqi officials were carefully considering offering safe haven to bin Laden and his closest collaborators in Nov. 1999. The source indicated the idea was put forward by the presumed head of Iraqi intelligence in Islamabad (Khalid Janaby) who in turn was in frequent contact and had good relations with bin Laden.
* 26. During a custodial interview, Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi [a senior al Qaeda operative] said he was told by an al Qaeda associate that he was tasked to travel to Iraq (1998) to establish a relationship with Iraqi intelligence to obtain poisons and gases training. After the USS Cole bombing in 2000, two al Qaeda operatives were sent to Iraq for CBW-related [Chemical and Biological Weapons] training beginning in Dec 2000. Iraqi intelligence was “encouraged” after the embassy and USS Cole bombings to provide this training.
* 27. According to sensitive CIA reporting, . . . the Saudi National Guard went on a kingdom-wide state of alert in late Dec 2000 after learning Saddam agreed to assist al Qaeda in attacking U.S./U.K. interests in Saudi Arabia.
* 31. An Oct. 2002 . . . report said al Qaeda and Iraq reached a secret agreement whereby Iraq would provide safe haven to al Qaeda members and provide them with money and weapons. The agreement reportedly prompted a large number of al Qaeda members to head to Iraq. The report also said that al Qaeda members involved in a fraudulent passport network for al Qaeda had been directed to procure 90 Iraqi and Syrian passports for al Qaeda personnel.
* 37. Sensitive reporting indicates senior terrorist planner and close al Qaeda associate al Zarqawi has had an operational alliance with Iraqi officials. As of Oct. 2002, al Zarqawi maintained contacts with the IIS to procure weapons and explosives, including surface-to-air missiles from an IIS officer in Baghdad. According to sensitive reporting, al Zarqawi was setting up sleeper cells in Baghdad to be activated in case of a U.S. occupation of the city, suggesting his operational cooperation with the Iraqis may have deepened in recent months. Such cooperation could include IIS provision of a secure operating bases [sic] and steady access to arms and explosives in preparation for a possible U.S. invasion. Al Zarqawi’s procurements from the Iraqis also could support al Qaeda operations against the U.S. or its allies elsewhere.
* 38. According to sensitive reporting, a contact with good access who does not have an established reporting record: An Iraqi intelligence service officer said that as of mid-March the IIS was providing weapons to al Qaeda members located in northern Iraq, including rocket propelled grenade (RPG)-18 launchers. According to IIS information, northern Iraq-based al Qaeda members believed that the U.S. intended to strike al Qaeda targets during an anticipated assault against Ansar al-Islam positions.
Rich
Hi Rich,
I’m aware of the Petraeus shift toward the Sunnis, for which I’ve provided commentary on this blog.
I disagree with you regarding Iranian interests in Iraq. Iran supports its own Shia leaders within the Shia dominated government. And remember, too much instability could cross over across the border into Iran, something Iran doesn’t want to see happen under any circumstances.
You misunderstand me Rich, regarding comparisons to past military conflicts. My criticism is that you based relations between past conflicts on general analogy rather than relevant, substantive factors.
There is substantial information in the press and on the internet regarding Iranian Kh-56 cruise missiles. Simply perform a search on Yahoo or Google, “iran kh56 cruise missile”. Also, a number of US government reports list this missile, some even with a nuclear payload. Do a search and you’ll see. I’ve pointed this out to many folks on related blogs.
Considering your offer on information regarding the Iranian Army of the 16th century, I agree with you- I’m more interested in past Iranian armies, as well. How about information regarding the 18th Century destroyer of the Moghul Empire? Nadir Shah. Alas, this is not relevant to the current blog post.
Hope to chat with you soon on another blog post.
Mark