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		<title>Blog Them Out of the Stone Age</title>
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		<description><![CDATA[A War Historian Blog]]></description>
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	<item rdf:about="http://warhistorian.org/blog1/?entry=entry060212-122019">
		<title>Manliness and the Military Ethos  - Pt 1</title>
		<link>http://warhistorian.org/blog1/index.php?entry=entry060212-122019</link>
		<description><![CDATA[<img src="images/courtney-cmg.jpg" width=432 height=323 border=0 alt=''><br />My personal trainer, Courtney Wilson, oversees one of my strength training routines.<br /><br />Private Grimsley, don&#039;t feel blue.<br />Tinker Bell was a fairy too.<br /><br />-- Improvised cadence call by my drill sergeant in Basic Combat Training, Fort Sill, Oklahoma, 1983.<br /><br />Part 1 - <a href="http://" target="_blank" >Part 2</a> (link not yet active)]]></description>
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		<author>profgrimsley@gmail.com</author>
		<pubDate>Sun, 12 Feb 2006 18:20:19 GMT</pubDate>
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	<item rdf:about="http://warhistorian.org/blog1/?entry=entry060212-001232">
		<title>Why Military History Still Sucks</title>
		<link>http://warhistorian.org/blog1/index.php?entry=entry060212-001232</link>
		<description><![CDATA[<strong>A guest post by Nicolas Palar, a junior majoring in history at <a href="http://www.purchase.edu/" target="_blank" >Purchase College SUNY</a>.</strong><br /><br />(This originated as a lengthy comment on <a href="http://warhistorian.org/blog1/index.php?entry=entry060211-001616" target="_blank" >After the Knee-Jerk, Part 3</a>.  I thought it shouldn&#039;t be buried and, with Nicolas&#039; permission, have made it a full-fledged post.  The title is mine.  It&#039;s an echo of <a href="http://www.warhistorian.org/why_military_history_sucks.php" target="_blank" >Why Military History Sucks</a>, the title of an informal essay I wrote in 1996. - Mark G.) <br /><br />My critique of military history lies with the practitioners of military history. There is a fundamental lack of coherent “military theory” to explain wars and battles. Mark Grimsley’s series of posts <a href="http://warhistorian.org/blog1/index.php?entry=entry050411-060351" target="_blank" >The Canon of Military History</a> demonstrates this very well. If the starting point is declared to be Clausewitz and <a href="http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0691027641/104-2870565-2499151" target="_blank" >Makers of Modern Strategy</a>, indeed it is a very weak starting point.<br /><br />I say this because the center of the canon of military history needs to be a model through which military victory, defeat, and change can be explained.  Both works fall short in this regard. Clausewitz has a message strongly rooted in its time period and is less universal than many of his proponents suggest. <i>Makers of Modern Strategy</i>, although an excellent work, only begins to address the issue of military history as a process and, as Hew Strachan points out in his January 1988 review in the <i>Journal of Military History</i>, is by no means comprehensive and in some ways lacking.<br /><br />This failure of military history is thoroughly demonstrated by any number of works. I offer a <a href="http://hnn.us/blogs/entries/21016.html" target="_blank" >quote</a> from Chris Bray at  <i>Cliopatria</i>:<blockquote>The February 24, 1865 edition of the Augusta County, Virginia <i>Vindicator</i> poured out vitriol over the defeatists who claimed that Confederate armies were doing poorly in their war against the North. Warning that the &quot;croakers&quot; were causing more damage to the Confederacy than the enemy could, the newspaper argued that victory was just a matter of continued firmness in its pursuit: &quot;Our military condition is really better now than it has been at various periods in the past...The spirit of our soldiers is unshaken...They only ask the people to be firm. The women are ready to make every sacrifice -- the very children show fight. The concentration of our troops is inevitable -- the success of our arms certain, if we will only put ourselves (we mean those of us out of the army) under the lead of our women.&quot;<br /><br />Six weeks later, facing reality, Lee surrendered at Appomattox.</blockquote>The assumptions that go into this statement are manifold. Defeat is simply a matter of &quot;facing reality&quot;: by February 1865 the Civil War was over (and yet paradoxically it went on until late May), and continued support for the war was futile. These assumptions are endemic to military operational history. There is a primacy given to major battles and negotiations between leaders that is important but fundamentally at odds with everything we have learned from social history in recent years.<br /><br />History is made through <i>many</i> actors, not just the elites, and history as a process must be examined in a comprehensive manner. Some works indeed have tackled the question of Confederate defeat in a more sophisticated manner; e.g., <a href="http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0820313963/104-2870565-2499151" target="_blank" >Why The South Lost The Civil War</a> by Beringer, Hattaway, Jones, and Still. However, the prevailing notion by military historians is to simplify military history into major battles and diplomatic relations.<br /><br />There is a very specific reason why this paucity of theory is so damaging. Under certain hands outside of the military history profession,  war becomes a process that is resolved <i>independently</i> of military history.  That is to say, wars have an inevitable outcome regardless of the agency of military leaders and soldiers. This strand of thought seems most powerful in areas where military history is most confused. Hence, an account of the American Civil War can refer to simply economic factors as the reason for Northern victory or simply a battle or two such as Gettysburg and Vicksburg. An account of the Vietnam War can dismiss operational war entirely, but giving the nationalist movement an overly strong agency and dismissing U.S. and South Vietnamese forces as “incompetent” and “unable to understand the nature of the conflict.” This claim is further bolstered by pundits and historians stating “we won every battle but lost the war” in regard to Vietnam. Why study the battles if they are irrelevant?<br /><br />As another example, take the ongoing debate on the effectiveness of strategic bombing (in Vietnam, World War II, etc.) Without a discrete answer that is backed on indisputable grounds, military history becomes marginalized. Strategic bombing becomes a process that is determined by racism and masculinity and the strategic considerations made by military leaders can become irrelevant as the actual effect of the bombing has not been resolved in satisfactory manner.<br /><br />In this sense, military history has failed in a very real matter. There are many works that address the complex dynamics in military history but if we look at the quintessential book of Civil War synthesis, James M. McPherson&#039;s <a href="http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/019516895X/104-2870565-2499151" target="_blank" >Battle Cry of Freedom</a>, it seems to commit the fallacy I’ve just discussed. Defeat is ultimately placed on several key battlefields without a solid understanding as to why this should be. Without the ability to cogently explain military change in its full complexity, military historians will continue to have their work marginalized by other historians who can offer simplified models of causation.<br /><br />Having stated this flaw, I feel it is important to point where military history is going in the correct direction. Obviously, as Tom Bruscino points out, the recent publications on Vietnam military history have important ramifications for our interpretation of the war and it remains too early to see if they will be accepted as part of the main narrative of Vietnam War studies. The recent reconsiderations of Schlieffen plan in <i>War in History</i>, once resolved, will have an important impact on considering the causes of World War I that cannot be ignored. David Glantz’s consideration of the operational feasibility for Stalin to intervene in Warsaw sheds new and important light on that issue. John Lynn’s notion of a military history that pays attention to cultural conceptions of war is, I believe, the most exciting and important new development in the field.<br /><br />However, these works do not successfully challenge the main narrative of history. The rise of social history was contingent on its ability to bring a new depth to our historical narratives in a manner that has not been reciprocated by works of military history. I believe one day a comprehensive work on Vietnam will be created that will showcase both sides of the hill and offer a more in-depth look at the creation of American and Vietnamese strategy from both the bottom and the top.  But despite the recent works on Vietnam, this has not been done. A work such as this will demolish any myths that simplify Vietnam military history to the point to which it can be ignored in history classes except for a mention of the Tet Offensive. Not until seminal works such as this are completed can military history join the ranks of the rest of the academy equally. As an example of success in this manner I offer Hew Strachan’s <a href="http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0199261911/104-2870565-2499151" target="_blank" >To Arms</a>. It seems to me that any study of World War I can refer to it profitably in a way which is not true for any recent major work of American military history.<br /><br />A fundamental area in which military historians are silent is in combating the simplified theories of military process that are always emerging. The most recent answers to the paucity of theory related to military history as a process producing important historical change seem to be are a return to Clausewitz and the new generational warfare demonstrated by Thomas X. Hammes&#039;s <a href="http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0760320594/104-2870565-2499151" target="_blank" >The Sling and the Stone</a>. Both works are limited and it is my belief that <i>The Sling and the Stone</i> is dangerous in its historical assumptions and treatment of historical examples. A comprehensive attack must be made on these works. Without a robust theory of military process, academic military historians have their work cheapened and easily replaced by amateurs or non-specialists. It is readily apparent to me that warfare and military history is best approached by knowledgeable specialists, but until simplified notions of historical process regarding wars are destroyed no progress can be made.<br /><br />In the end, I guess I do mean to blame the victim, but this comes from the experience of reading a lot of military history and becoming appalled by the gaps in military historiography and the assumptions made by military historians particularly in America. Important glimmers of scholarship appear in U.S. military history, but there is as yet nothing comparable to Marc Bloch&#039;s <a href="http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0226059782/104-2870565-2499151" target="_blank" >Feudal Society</a> or  E. P. Thompson&#039;s <a href="http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0394703227/104-2870565-2499151" target="_blank" >The Making of the English Working Class</a>, works that fundamentally redefined their respective fields.]]></description>
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		<author>profgrimsley@gmail.com</author>
		<pubDate>Sun, 12 Feb 2006 06:12:32 GMT</pubDate>
	</item>
	<item rdf:about="http://warhistorian.org/blog1/?entry=entry060211-001616">
		<title>After the Knee-Jerk - Pt 3</title>
		<link>http://warhistorian.org/blog1/index.php?entry=entry060211-001616</link>
		<description><![CDATA[<a href="http://warhistorian.org/blog1/index.php?entry=entry060210-150234" target="_blank" >Tom&#039;s Bruscino&#039;s post</a> gave me the itch to email Professor Macias-Gonzalez and inquire directly about his apparently dim view of military history.  He sent a very gracious reply.  I won&#039;t go into it, since it was a private communication, but we plan to chat by phone next week.  I look forward to that. <br /><br />By coincidence, I happened to run across this passage the other day.  It&#039;s from the preface to <a href="http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/1560988711/104-2870565-2499151" target="_blank" >Blankets of Fire:  U.S. Bombers Over Japan in World War II</a> (1996), an excellent study by Kenneth  P. Werrell, a former US Air Force officer and professor emeritus at Radford University:<blockquote>[M]ilitary history is regarded with suspicion by a segment of the public and by some academics.  Certainly, it reveals man at his worst, with much blood and brutality, and despite the &#039;new military history&#039; that emphasizes non-combat aspects, military history is still basically about wars and battles.  To make matters worse, the good guys do not always win.  Nevertheless, military history continues to be of interest to the public.  As the English writer Thomas Hardy put it so well, &quot;War makes rattling good history; but peace is poor reading.&quot;<br /><br />If the content of military history is a problem, so, too, is its writing.  Unlike other fields of history, it is written mainly by journalists, who tend to sensationalize, and by former military men, who tend to justify.  Most academics shy away from it, since they are uncomfortable with the content, unfamiliar with the technology, and unsympathetic with the military ethos.  To be perfectly honest, academia&#039;s intellectual bias is not only against war, but also against the warriors and the study of war.  As a consequence, a lower percentage of books in the field of history are written by academics, and myth-making, hero worship, romance, and glory are more the stuff of this branch of history than of any other.</blockquote><br /><br /><a href="http://warhistorian.org/blog1/index.php?entry=entry060209-003202" target="_blank" >Part 1</a> - <a href="http://warhistorian.org/blog1/index.php?entry=entry060210-150234" target="_blank" >Part 2</a> - Part 3]]></description>
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		<author>profgrimsley@gmail.com</author>
		<pubDate>Sat, 11 Feb 2006 06:16:16 GMT</pubDate>
	</item>
	<item rdf:about="http://warhistorian.org/blog1/?entry=entry060210-150234">
		<title>After the Knee-Jerk - Pt 2</title>
		<link>http://warhistorian.org/blog1/index.php?entry=entry060210-150234</link>
		<description><![CDATA[That <a href="http://warhistorian.org/blog1/index.php?entry=entry060209-003202" target="_blank" >request </a> on H-LatAm has prompted some interesting <a href="http://bigtent2.blogspot.com/2006/02/blaming-victim.html" target="_blank" >reflections</a> by Tom Bruscino, a recently-minted Ohio University PhD now working as a researcher-historian at the <a href="http://usacac.army.mil/cac/csi/index.asp" target="_blank" >Combat Studies Institute</a>.  As it did with me, the statement by Professor Macias-Gonzalez that &quot;of course&quot; he at first wanted to divert his students from studying military history struck a nerve with Tom.  So did the professor&#039;s request for &quot;a historiographical article on US military history, as in, moving beyond strategy, guns, uniforms, and the like.&quot;<br /><br />At least he asked, Tom concedes.  &quot;But the way he asked says so much. Say I were to have a job interview for a position teaching American history with a focus on women&#039;s history, and I had to give a lecture on the passage of the 19th Amendment. I would go to women&#039;s historians for help. I would not say, &#039;I&#039;ve been asked to give a lecture on the 19th Amendment. My knee-jerk reaction, of course, was to object, but I want departments to teach subjects that are near and dear to their hearts. Is there a historiography on women&#039;s history that goes beyond burning bras?&#039;&quot;<br /><br />But maybe, Tom writes, military historians actually &quot;enable&quot; that kind of ignorance by half-apologizing for the field or--I can&#039;t help but think--trying  to blog it out of the Stone Age. :-)<br /><br />Anyway, it&#039;s good stuff.  <a href="http://bigtent2.blogspot.com/2006/02/blaming-victim.html" target="_blank" >Have a look.</a><br /><br /><a href="http://warhistorian.org/blog1/index.php?entry=entry060209-003202" target="_blank" >Part 1</a> - Part 2 - <a href="http://warhistorian.org/blog1/index.php?entry=entry060211-001616" target="_blank" >Part 3</a>]]></description>
		<guid isPermaLink="true">http://warhistorian.org/blog1/?entry=entry060210-150234</guid>
		<author>profgrimsley@gmail.com</author>
		<pubDate>Fri, 10 Feb 2006 21:02:34 GMT</pubDate>
	</item>
	<item rdf:about="http://warhistorian.org/blog1/?entry=entry060210-001857">
		<title>A Kinder, Gentler Reconstruction</title>
		<link>http://warhistorian.org/blog1/index.php?entry=entry060210-001857</link>
		<description><![CDATA[<img src="images/homecoming-1865.jpg" width=432 height=293 border=0 alt=''><br />The most recent number of <i>Civil War History</i> makes a fascinating foray into the realm of counterfactual history.  Five essays revisit the post-Civil War period to explore &quot;Reconstruction as It Should Have Been.&quot;  They are plainly relevant to our spring <a href="http://warhistorian.org/blog1/index.php?entry=entry060128-144650" target="_blank" >readings course</a> and also to the autumn Mershon conference on <a href="http://warhistorian.org/blog1/index.php?entry=entry051028-045151" target="_blank" >the War for the American South</a>.<br /><br />You can access them online--in my case via the <a href="http://journals.ohiolink.edu:20080/cgi-bin/sciserv.pl?collection=journals" target="_blank" >OhioLINK  Electronic Journal Center</a>.<br /><br />Here are the essays:<br /> <br />James L. Huston,  &quot;Reconstruction as It Should Have Been: An Exercise in Counterfactual History&quot; (358-363)<br /><br />Roger L. Ransom, &quot;Reconstructing Reconstruction: Options and Limitations to Federal Policies on Land Distribution in 1866-67&quot; (364-377) <br /><br />Heather Cox Richardson, &quot;A Marshall Plan for the South? The Failure of Republican and Democratic Ideology during Reconstruction&quot; (378-387)<br /><br />William Blair, &quot;The Use of Military Force to Protect the Gains of Reconstruction (388-4020<br /><br />James L. Huston, &quot;An Alternative to the Tragic Era: Applying the Virtues of Bureaucracy to the Reconstruction Dilemma&quot; (403-415)<br /><br />Michael Vorenberg, &quot;Imagining a Different Reconstruction Constitution<br />(416-426)<br /><br />Robert Francis, &quot;The Missing Catalyst: In Response to Essays on Reconstructions That Might Have Been&quot; (427-431)]]></description>
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		<author>profgrimsley@gmail.com</author>
		<pubDate>Fri, 10 Feb 2006 06:18:57 GMT</pubDate>
	</item>
	<item rdf:about="http://warhistorian.org/blog1/?entry=entry060209-172612">
		<title>Professors As Writers</title>
		<link>http://warhistorian.org/blog1/index.php?entry=entry060209-172612</link>
		<description><![CDATA[<iframe src="http://rcm.amazon.com/e/cm?t=warhistoriano-20&o=1&p=8&l=as1&asins=091350713X&fc1=000000&IS2=1&lt1=_blank&lc1=0000ff&bc1=000000&bg1=ffffff&f=ifr" style="width:120px;height:240px;" scrolling="no" marginwidth="0" marginheight="0" frameborder="0"></iframe><br /><br />I&#039;ve been a writer almost as long as I&#039;ve been able to write.  I composed my first short story at eight, drafted a 25-page &quot;novel&quot; at ten, and published my first article at twenty.  I always thought it would get easier over time.  But to my horror, it remains as tough as ever.<br /><br />Over the years I&#039;ve learned various tricks to help me through the process.  One of the best was the writing journal.  That is to say, I&#039;d keep a journal concerning a given project.  Into it I&#039;d jot anything having to do with the project:  ideas, progress, frustrations, etc.  Not infrequently the entries would germinate into paragraphs that, with minor revisions, wound up as text in the actual manuscript.  Another useful tool, as I&#039;ve said repeatedly, has been this blog.  But battling that inner critical voice is a lot like fighting <a href="http://www.startrek.com/startrek/view/library/aliens/article/70558.html" target="_blank" >the Borg</a>:  It seems endlessly to adapt to my tactics and I have to find new ones.<br /><br />Consequently I&#039;m a regular consumer of books on writing.  One that I&#039;ve found useful of late is Robert Boice&#039;s <i>Professors as Writers</i>, which is one of the few works I&#039;ve seen that address issues specific to academics, most notably the need to make good use of relatively small blocks of time.  (This is less of a problem when one isn&#039;t teaching, but even then a surprising amount of time is expended in committee work, administrative chores, advising students, etc.)  Boice is a psychologist who has actually studied such things as writer&#039;s block in a clinical way.  He was also regularly consulted by colleagues who had problems writing until he more or less codified the advice he gave them.  Anyway, I recommend it.]]></description>
		<guid isPermaLink="true">http://warhistorian.org/blog1/?entry=entry060209-172612</guid>
		<author>profgrimsley@gmail.com</author>
		<pubDate>Thu, 09 Feb 2006 23:26:12 GMT</pubDate>
	</item>
	<item rdf:about="http://warhistorian.org/blog1/?entry=entry060209-003202">
		<title>After the Knee-Jerk - Pt 1</title>
		<link>http://warhistorian.org/blog1/index.php?entry=entry060209-003202</link>
		<description><![CDATA[At the end of January the following query appeared on <a href="http://www.h-net.org/~latam/" target="_blank" >H-LatAm</a>.  It was brought to my attention by a colleague who specializes in the history of modern Mexico:<blockquote>Estimadisimas/os:<br /><br />I&#039;m a fish out of water . . . help!   I am teaching my historiography seminar, and two of my 8 students want to work on Military History.   My knee-jerk reaction, of course, was to object, but I want the students to work on topics that are close and dear to their hearts . . . any suggestions for germinal works on military history?<br /><br />V.<br /><br />Victor M. Macias-Gonzalez, Ph.D. Associate Professor of History and<br />Director, UW-La Crosse Institute for Latino and Latin American Studies <br />The University of Wisconsin-La Crosse</blockquote>My own knee-jerk reaction was to bridle at Prof. Macias-Gonzalez&#039;s knee-jerk reaction, until I realized that the substance of his query was constructive and entirely appropriate.  Sometimes I&#039;m just too thin-skinned.<br /><br />The query brought a flurry of responses, most of them suggesting works on Latin American military history.  Prof. Macias-Gonzalez wrote a second time to clarify that in this instance, he needed leads concerning military history generally:<blockquote>What I would like is a historiographical article on US military history, as in, moving beyond strategy, guns, uniforms, and the like. Dare I think there may be something in U.S. military history similar to what we have witnessed in our own field over the last 15-20 years with the influence of cultural history and gender?</blockquote>In the meantime, Bruce Castleman, an editor at <a href="http://www.h-net.org/~war/" target="_blank" >H-War</a>, cross-posted the query to that list.<br /><br />All in all, Prof. Macias-Gonzalez wound up receiving seventeen responses to his request.  Two of them happened to mention this web site, so I thought I&#039;d echo one respondent who suggested a look at <a href="http://warhistorian.org/military_historiography.php" target="_blank" >Military Historiography:  A Select Bibliography</a>.  For undergraduates interested in military history but new to the subject as an academic field, I&#039;d point to two essays in particular:<br /><br />Peter Karsten, &quot;Demilitarizing Military History:  Servants of Power or Agents of Understanding?&quot;  <i>Military Affairs</i> 36 (October 1972):88-96.<br /><br />John A. Lynn, &quot;The Embattled Future of Military History.&quot;  <i>Journal of Military History</i> 61:4 (October 1997):777-789.<br /><br />Both are available through <a href="http://www.jstor.org/" target="_blank" >JSTOR</a>.<br /><br />I&#039;d also like to repeat the original question for discussion here--with the proviso that we&#039;re looking for works especially appropriate for undergraduates:  &quot;any suggestions for germinal works on military history?&quot;<br /><br />Part 1 - <a href="http://warhistorian.org/blog1/index.php?entry=entry060210-150234" target="_blank" >Part 2</a> - <a href="http://warhistorian.org/blog1/index.php?entry=entry060211-001616" target="_blank" >Part 3</a>]]></description>
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		<author>profgrimsley@gmail.com</author>
		<pubDate>Thu, 09 Feb 2006 06:32:02 GMT</pubDate>
	</item>
	<item rdf:about="http://warhistorian.org/blog1/?entry=entry060207-102556">
		<title>Moral Disengagement</title>
		<link>http://warhistorian.org/blog1/index.php?entry=entry060207-102556</link>
		<description><![CDATA[Today&#039;s New York Times has a lengthy story entitled <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/07/health/psychology/07exec.html" target="_blank" >When Death is On the Docket, the Moral Compass Wavers</a> (free registration required):<blockquote>Common wisdom holds that people have a set standard of morality that never wavers. Yet studies of people who do unpalatable things, whether by choice, or for reasons of duty or economic necessity, find that people&#039;s moral codes are more flexible than generally understood. To buffer themselves from their own consciences, people often adjust their moral judgments in a process some psychologists call moral disengagement, or moral distancing.<br /><br />In recent years, researchers have determined the psychological techniques most often used to disengage, and for the first time they have tested them in people working in perhaps the most morally challenging job short of soldiering, staffing a prison execution team.</blockquote>As the reference to soldiering indicates, the psychological dynamic involved has obvious implications for the study of military history.<br /><br />But it also has implications for the study of military history--or any academic subject, for that matter--in a different sense:<blockquote>In a 2004 study, professors at Iowa State University and the University of Arkansas tested the moral judgment of 47 college students who had cheated on a take-home exam, a complex accounting problem.<br /><br />Many of the students found a solution to the problem online — posted by another professor who was unaware it was part of an exam — and reproduced the solution as their own, though it used techniques they had not yet learned. Others had clearly collaborated, which their professor had explicitly forbidden. Another 17 students had not cheated, as far as their teacher could determine.<br /><br />The professor threw out the test scores and got permission from the students to ask about their behavior. The cheaters&#039; scores on a standard test of moral judgment did not correlate at all with their level of plagiarism or collaboration. On the contrary, it was the most dishonest male students who scored highest on the morals test.<br /><br />&quot;Clearly, this is not what you want to find in a test of moral judgment,&quot; said Dr. Ravenscroft, a co-author of the study, with Charles Shrader of Iowa State and Tim West of the University of Arkansas.<br /><br />Only by conducting in-depth interviews with students about their behavior did the researchers begin to see clear, familiar patterns. One was displacing the blame: &quot;I think it&#039;s hard for people not to look at the answer manual if it&#039;s available,&quot; said one student. &quot;Maybe you should have taken the problem off so people wouldn&#039;t be tempted.&quot;<br /><br />Another was justifying the behavior by comparison: &quot;I really don&#039;t consider working with another person that unethical,&quot; one student commented. &quot;Taking and copying answers from the key was highly unethical.&quot; Many students &quot;rationalized cheating behavior as a necessary defense to the cheating of others,&quot; the researchers concluded in their analysis, to appear this year in the Business and Professional Ethics Journal.</blockquote>]]></description>
		<guid isPermaLink="true">http://warhistorian.org/blog1/?entry=entry060207-102556</guid>
		<author>profgrimsley@gmail.com</author>
		<pubDate>Tue, 07 Feb 2006 16:25:56 GMT</pubDate>
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	<item rdf:about="http://warhistorian.org/blog1/?entry=entry060128-144650">
		<title>Coming Attractions</title>
		<link>http://warhistorian.org/blog1/index.php?entry=entry060128-144650</link>
		<description><![CDATA[My department regularly compiles a booklet of detailed <a href="http://history.osu.edu/courses/curriculum/crsbk_sp06.cfm" target="_blank" >course descriptions</a> for each upcoming quarter.  The descriptions for Spring Quarter recently appeared, and students have begun consulting them.<br /><br />I&#039;ll be teaching two courses.<br /><br />The first is <a href="http://history.osu.edu/courses/syllabi/syllabus.cfm?SYL=hist307.htm" target="_blank" >History 307:  World War II</a>.  The course was originally slated to be taught by my colleague, Allan Millett, but his decision to retire at the end of 2005 meant that either the course had to be cancelled or someone else would have to offer it.  Opting for the latter, the department asked me to take charge of the course in place of my scheduled course offering, <a href="http://history.osu.edu/courses/syllabi/syllabus.cfm?SYL=hist151.htm" target="_blank" >History 151:  American Civilization, 1607-1877</a>.  It found money to hire an instructor to teach my History 151 section.  The decision underscores the value of military history courses in a budget environment based on student enrollment.  But it also impeaches the stereotype about academic antipathy toward military history, for the department made this decision proactively, without the slightest nudge from faculty within the field.<br /><br />The second is a readings course I&#039;ll be teaching in collaboration with another of my colleagues, <a href="http://history.osu.edu/people/person.cfm?ID=713" target="_blank" >Geoffrey Parker</a>.  Nominally it&#039;s a History 767:  Studies in Military History, but each 767 offering focuses on a specific theme, and ours is <a href="http://warhistorian.org/history-767-syllabus.doc" target="_blank" >The Role of Armed Coercion in the Rise of Western Dominance</a>.  (You&#039;ll find a draft syllabus via the link.)  Here&#039;s the course description:<blockquote>This course analyzes a number of key military encounters between &quot;the West and the Rest;&quot; i.e., between Europe with its settler societies and the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.  It begins with the encounter between Persia and Classical Greece and concludes with Desert Storm and 9/11.  We will examine each of these encounters from a counterfactual (as well as from a factual) point of view.  We will therefore consider what might have happened, as well as what did happen, at key points on the rise of the West to global dominance.</blockquote>The description reflects our interest in broadening military history to achieve a global perspective and also in counterfactual theory.  I&#039;ve dabbled in counterfactual theory a few times on this blog and am writing a book on 1864 that employs counterfactual analysis; Geoffrey is quite seasoned at it, having done a counterfactual history of the Spanish Armada for Robert Cowley&#039;s <a href="http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0425176428/002-3930761-4908031" target="_blank" >What If?  America&#039;s Foremost Military Historians Imagine What Might Have Been</a> and having edited, with Philip Tetlock and Ned Lebow, a fascinating volume entitled <a href="http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/047211543X/" target="_blank" >Unmaking the West:    Counterfactual Narratives and Contingency in World History</a> (forthcoming from University of Michigan Press).<br /><br />The fun part has been to settle on a set of case studies.  We followed two basic rules:  each case study had to involve an encounter between a &quot;western&quot; and &quot;non-western&quot; power that had the potential to significantly reshape the course of future events, and each had to have enough English-language source material on the non-western side to afford an adequate window on that perspective.  Here&#039;s the schedule of sessions we came up with.  I&#039;ve omitted the readings; you can find those in the draft syllabus.<br /><br />March 28<br />Making and &quot;Unmaking&quot; the West:  An Introduction to Counterfactual Historical Analysis<br /><br />April 4<br />ReOrientation:  Is Western Dominance a Temporary Phase?<br /><br />April 11<br />Smothering the West in its Cradle?:  A Counterfactual Salamis <br /><br />April 18<br />Montezuma’s Revenge:  Cortés fails to capture Mexico<br /><br />April 25 [Holocaust Remembrance Day]<br />Presentation and discussion of projects to be written by seminar members (about 5 minutes each)<br /><br />May 2<br />Unmaking the &quot;American Holocaust&quot;:  North American Indians Achieve Substantial Immunity from European Disease<br /><br />May 9<br />The Even Longer Peace?:  Unmaking and Remaking the First World War<br /> <br />May 16<br />A Nonviolent Revolution Turns Violent:  Race War in the American South, 1954-1970<br /><br />May 23<br />The September 11 Attacks]]></description>
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		<author>profgrimsley@gmail.com</author>
		<pubDate>Sat, 28 Jan 2006 20:46:50 GMT</pubDate>
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		<title>War and the American Experience, 1607-1914</title>
		<link>http://warhistorian.org/blog1/index.php?entry=entry060127-150230</link>
		<description><![CDATA[I&#039;ve updated the <a href="http://warhistorian.org/war-and-american-experience-1607-1914.rtf" target="_blank" >Reading List in American Military History, 1607-1914</a>.  Like any such list, it&#039;s somewhat subjective, but since it runs to 33 pages, I think I may safely say it errs on the side of inclusiveness.  The next step is to distill from it about twenty-five titles.  They&#039;ll go into the comprehensive reading list for the PhD general exam, which my colleagues and I are currently revising.]]></description>
		<guid isPermaLink="true">http://warhistorian.org/blog1/?entry=entry060127-150230</guid>
		<author>profgrimsley@gmail.com</author>
		<pubDate>Fri, 27 Jan 2006 21:02:30 GMT</pubDate>
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